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HOW LAWYERS’ INTUITIONS 
PROLONG LITIGATION 
ANDREW J. WISTRICH* 
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI† 
ABSTRACT 
Most lawsuits settle, but some settle later than they should. Too many 
compromises occur only after protracted discovery and expensive motion 
practice. Sometimes the delay precludes settlement altogether. Why does 
this happen? Several possibilities—such as the alleged greed of lawyers 
paid on an hourly basis—have been suggested, but they are insufficient to 
explain why so many cases do not settle until the eve of trial. We offer a 
novel account of the phenomenon of settling on the courthouse steps that is 
based upon empirical research concerning judgment and choice. Several 
cognitive illusions—the framing effect, the confirmation bias, 
nonconsequentialist reasoning, and the sunk-cost fallacy—produce 
intuitions in lawyers that can induce them to postpone serious settlement 
negotiations or to reject settlement proposals that should be accepted. 
Lawyers’ tendencies to rely excessively on intuition exacerbate the impact 
of those cognitive illusions. The experiments presented in this Article 
indicate that the vulnerability of experienced lawyers to these cognitive 
errors can prolong litigation. 
[TOC] 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Settlement is a critical aspect of civil litigation.1 Although the exact 
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settlement rate is unclear, most cases settle.2 This is fortunate because, 
absent settlement, civil litigation would quickly overwhelm the courts and 
undermine the goals of the legal system.3 Settlement also gives the parties 
an opportunity to obtain a resolution that is mutually satisfactory, whereas 
adjudication tends to produce a winner and a loser, or even to impose a 
solution that neither party wants.4 Although an excessively high settlement 
rate might be undesirable,5 most observers recognize that settling civil 
 
 1. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
119, 137 (2002) (“A basic truth, then, is that settlement is numerically much more important than actual 
litigation.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We 
Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009) (“[S]ettlement is the modal case outcome.”); 
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And 
Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212 (1992) (“Settlement is where the action is.”). By the term 
“settlement,” we mean any consensual compromise or trade of a claim for value, whether monetary or 
nonmonetary. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a settlement as “[a]n 
agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit”). 
 2. Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 1, at 146 (“If a single settlement rate is to be invoked, it 
should be that about two-thirds of civil cases settle . . . .”); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases 
Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1387 (1994) 
(“[M]ost litigation results in settlement and . . . the portion of cases settled is increasing.”); Herbert M. 
Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162–64 (1986) 
(estimating that only 22 percent of cases are resolved by trial, arbitration, decisions, or dismissal for 
cause); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal 
Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 181, 186–87 (2010) (reporting the results of a study of 1672 employment 
discrimination cases filed in seven regionally diverse U.S. district courts during the period 1988 through 
2003, and asserting that “settlement is the modal outcome”); Robert I. Weil, This Judge for Hire, CAL. 
LAW., Aug. 1992, at 41, 42 (reporting that out of every one hundred cases filed, sixty-seven are settled, 
thirty are decided on motion, and only three are tried). 
 3. See Nathalie Chappe, Demand for Civil Trials and Court Congestion, 33 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 
343, 344 (2012) (“Delays in the resolution of legal disputes create a wide variety of social costs: injured 
parties do not receive compensation when they most need it, individuals are deterred from bringing 
cases, future offences are insufficiently deterred . . . .”); Michael Mitsopoulos & Theodore Pelagidis, 
Does Staffing Affect the Time to Dispose Cases in Greek Courts?, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 219, 220 
(2007) (“The significance that the presence of the rule of law, which nowadays is described by a 
coherent, predictable, speedy and consistent judicial decision-making process from case filing until 
final case disposition, has on economic activity has been stressed repeatedly in economic theory . . . .”); 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 399, 445 (1973) (“To most experts in judicial administration, delay between the filing and 
final disposition of a legal claim is an unmitigated evil . . . .”); George L. Priest, Private Litigants and 
the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 534 (1989) (expressing the concern that “litigation 
delay . . . reduces the likelihood of litigation”). 
 4. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 2, at 1350–51 (listing fifteen reasons why settlement is 
superior to adjudication); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2692 (1995) (listing eight 
positive attributes of settlement). 
 5. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“[S]ettlement is a 
capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.”); Marc 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 526 (2004) (arguing that a lack of fully adjudicated cases 
WIST7 4/14/2013  1:55 PM 
2013] LAWYERS’ INTUITIONS 103 
disputes harnesses the judgment of the attorneys and often a settlement 
judge or other mediator to offer the parties a satisfactory resolution of their 
dispute without the expense that further litigation would entail. 
The terms of settlements are important, but the timing of settlements 
also matters. Early settlements can be difficult to achieve for a variety of 
reasons.6 Cases can also settle too early. Settlements consummated before 
the litigants possess adequate information, whether of factual or a legal 
nature, may be premature. Premature settlements might send inaccurate 
signals to the parties and to society about what conduct is permitted and 
what the consequences of impermissible conduct will be.7 Achieving a 
sensible settlement might sometimes require some litigation to generate 
adequate information about a case. Moreover, precipitous settlements also 
might be the product of untoward conduct by lawyers or others with 
incentives to dispense with a case cheaply and quickly.8 
On the other hand, settlements can occur too late. Delay in achieving a 
settlement can entail several undesirable consequences. First, in litigation, 
time is money. The longer the period of time that elapses between the filing 
of a lawsuit and its settlement, the more resources the parties are likely to 
invest in the litigation process.9 This is painful for them, and also costly for 
society, especially if the additional investment does not improve the quality 
 
produces a system in which “[j]udges preside over routine settlements that reflect not legal standards 
but the strategic position of the repeat players.”). 
 6. See Thomas J. Miceli, Settlement Delay As a Sorting Device, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1999) (“[D]elay is beneficial if it allows cases to settle that the defendant otherwise would have 
taken to trial.”). 
 7. See Galanter, supra note 5, at 526 (“The signals and markers that provide guidance for 
settlements derive increasingly from pronouncements that are not connected with an authoritative 
determination of facts.”); Katheryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 
10 J.L. ECON & ORG. 84, 93 (1994) (“[F]lat awards provide poor incentives for the injurer to take 
precautions to reduce the severity of an accident . . . . [A]wards that are sensitive to the true level of 
damages . . . provide better incentives for care.”). 
 8. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1343, 1371–73 (1995) (describing collusive settlements in mass tort cases); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class 
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987) (expressing concern with “sweetheart” settlement deals in 
which a plaintiff’s attorney offers a rapid, favorable settlement in exchange for a high fee); Judith 
Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and 
Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2178 (2000) (expressing the 
concern that common fee arrangements “may not provide sufficient incentive for lawyers to represent 
zealously . . . .”). 
 9. See Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Meditative Art: 
A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 898 (1997) (“By the time of 
settlement, the vast majority of the costs, fees, emotional distress, and diversion of time have already 
been expended.”) (footnote omitted). 
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of the settlement.10 Second, the longer a lawsuit is pending, the more 
resources the court is likely to be required to invest in keeping track of the 
case, managing the case, deciding motions presented by the parties, and 
preparing for the possibility of trial.11 Every judge can recall with 
frustration cases that settled on the day of trial—after the judge had 
devoted days to ruling on pretrial motions and to preparing jury instructions 
and verdict forms that were never used.12 Third, delay in resolution of a 
case might provide a strategic advantage to one party or the other. For 
example, a wealthy defendant may use the threat of delay to persuade an 
indigent plaintiff to accept a lower settlement in exchange for certain 
immediate payment.13 This means that some plaintiffs might recover less 
than they should, or if the resource disparity runs in the opposite direction, 
extract more than they deserve. Finally, delay postpones compensation for 
victims and potentially diminishes deterrence of wrongdoers.14 
An optimally timed settlement requires balancing the risks of 
premature settlement (which compromises the quality of settlement due to 
insufficient information, or precludes it because the parties’ views of the 
 
 10. Edward D. Shapiro, Settlement Counsel: Is It Right for Your Business?, MUCH SHELIST 
KNOWLEDGE CENTER (Oct. 21, 2009), http://muchshelist.com/knowledge-center/article/is-settlement-
counsel-right-for-your-business (“By settling your case earlier in the process . . . you will automatically 
reduce your litigation fees and related expenses. In particular, you will limit discovery and trial costs 
while accomplishing what would likely happen anyway, given that well over 95% of all cases settle 
before trial.”). 
 11. See John Dwight Ingram, Why Aren’t More Cases Settled?, 45 S.D. L. REV. 94, 94 (2000) 
(“Judges will almost always benefit from the early settlement of cases. Settlements reduce their case 
loads and judges are often rated, either formally or informally, by the number of cases they have 
disposed of.”) (footnote omitted); Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 
67, 88 (1969) (“Judicial resources are squandered if parties proceed to formal adjudication in cases 
where settlement would be more profitable for each, and society suffers when litigants devote their own 
resources to litigation needlessly.”). 
 12. See Malinda M. Sanders, Settlement on the Courthouse Steps, 61 BENCH & BAR MINN. Sept. 
2004, at 16, 16 (“While there was some feeling of relief that we could get back to our normal routines, 
there was also disgust for the complete waste of time and resources the last-minute settlement 
caused.”); Joel L. Schrag, Managerial Judges: An Economic Analysis of the Judicial Management of 
Legal Discovery, 30 RAND J. ECON. 305, 308 (1999) (“[M]any settlements are reached ‘on the 
courthouse steps,’ after discovery costs are sunk.”) (footnote omitted); Harry Woolf, Civil Justice in the 
United Kingdom, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 717 (1997) (“The very high rate of late settlement, especially 
settlement on the day of the trial, leads to overlisting by the courts in an attempt to ensure full use of 
judges’ time. Where cases fail to settle this results in further cost and delay for the cases which fail to 
come on. Where cases do settle it results in waste of judicial time.”). 
 13. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE 
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 85 (rev. 2d ed. 1980) (“[I]n selected cases delay may well be a tool of 
considerable power, and on occasions it may well be used consciously to lower the settlement . . . .”). 
 14. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 
28 PAC. L.J. 453, 491–93 (1997) (noting that delay in resolution of a claim diminishes both 
compensation and deterrence). 
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case have not converged) against the cost of unduly delayed settlement 
(which needlessly consumes litigant, court, and societal resources).15 Just 
as there is a spatial sweet spot for hitting a tennis ball, so is there a 
temporal sweet spot for settlements. Although faster is not always better 
when it comes to settlements, it is usually better.16 Late settlements appear 
to be a more common mistake than premature settlements because a 
significant percentage of cases settle after most or all discovery has been 
completed, on the eve of trial, or on the courthouse steps.17 
Why do parties often wait so long to settle civil lawsuits? Research on 
civil litigation suggests several possible explanations. First, assessing the 
settlement value of a case might be more difficult than it seems. 
Experienced lawyers and mediators frequently disagree about what cases 
are worth.18 That difficulty might promote procrastination.19 Second, the 
 
 15. See Stephen McGeorge Bundy, Valuing Accuracy—Filling out the Framework: Comment on 
Kaplow (2), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 433 (1994) (“Accuracy is a central aspiration of any procedural 
system, but it cannot be the only aspiration.”); Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Chilling, 
Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal Process, 26 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 144, 154 (2010) (“[A]ttempts 
to reduce the social costs dedicated to adjudication tend to decrease the accuracy of adjudication and 
may diminish the effectiveness of the legal process.”). 
 16. William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 367, 
370 (1999) (“While about ninety percent of civil cases settle before trial, there is widespread 
dissatisfaction with the amount of time and money spent before the cases are resolved.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Kathryn E. Spier, “Tied to the Mast”: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 
32 J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 93 (2003) (“[E]arly settlement is socially desirable . . . .”). 
 17. See Bullock & Gallagher, supra note 9, at 897 (“[A] large proportion of . . . settlements occur 
‘on the courthouse steps.’”) (footnote omitted); Friedman & Wickelgren, supra note 15, at 153–54 (“Of 
course, settlements ‘on the courthouse steps’ (which are a significant fraction of settlements) result in 
less litigation cost savings (discovery is often the most costly part of litigation) that are usually 
considered the primary benefit of settlement.”); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological 
Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 128 (1994) 
(“Many cases in the real world, in fact, do not settle until just before trial or even during trial.”) 
(footnote omitted); Miceli, supra note 6, at 270 (concluding that “a large percentage of cases settle 
close to trial” and “the settlement amount is increasing in the length of the delay (all else equal)”); 
Sanders, supra note 12, at 16 (“I know that lawsuits are frequently resolved on the courthouse steps, if 
not late on the eve of trial. I know that last-minute settlements are ‘standard operating procedure’ for 
many lawyers. I know that the pressure of an imminent trial date sometimes has more influence over 
parties’ decision to settle than any other factor.”); Stewart J. Schwab & Michael Heise, Splitting Logs: 
An Empirical Perspective on Employment Discrimination Settlements, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 931, 948 
(2011) (reporting a study of settlement of employment discrimination claims in the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, and asserting that “[s]etting a trial date is the only litigation-stage 
variable that exerted an important influence on final settlement amounts with some level of 
consistency.”); Spier, supra note 16, at 95 (“[M]any cases settle on the courthouse steps . . . .”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 18. PHILIP J. HERMANN, BETTER, EARLIER SETTLEMENTS THROUGH ECONOMIC LEVERAGE 
§ 2.02 (1989) (reporting that experienced lawyers’ evaluations of the same case for settlement purposes 
varies widely); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 36–38, 204–05 
(1974) (same); GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 5–7, 110–14 (1983) 
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parties might possess asymmetric access to information.20 Uncertainty can 
inhibit or delay settlement because it can cause the parties to persist in 
divergent predictions of the likely outcome.21 Uncertainty also can 
encourage parties to obtain more information. Third, lawyers’ greed might 
cause delay.22 Even though needless delays might damage their 
reputations,23 lawyers paid by the hour face financial incentives to 
postpone settlement.24 Fourth, parties might experience “regret aversion” 
and worry that they will later learn that the facts or law favor them far more 
than they initially believed.25 Finally, many lawyers avoid being the first to 
mention the possibility of settlement. They fear that proposing settlement 
 
(same). 
 19. See DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS 
AND MEDIATORS § 2.1.1, at 41 (1996) (“Disputants also delay negotiations . . . because they are 
reluctant to confront unpleasant issues, such as admitting that their initial assessment of a case was 
overoptimistic. In such situations, people will often react by procrastinating, perhaps hoping that 
additional discovery will rehabilitate their position or that the other side will give up.”); Rick Carnaroli, 
Procrastination, ADVOCATE, Feb. 2006, at 4, 4 (“It is hard to say that procrastination is the cause of 
settlement on the courthouse steps, but certainly there are cases that settle only because the parties have 
not adequately prepared for trial, or have put off settlement discussions until the last minute.”); Andrew 
J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 630 
(2008) (“If people find a task difficult or unpleasant, they are likely to defer performance of that 
task . . . .”). 
 20. See Spier, supra note 16, at 95 (“Private information often leads to inefficiencies in the 
settlement process; many cases settle in the courthouse steps, and some fail to settle altogether.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 21. Id. (“Settlement negotiations can fail when the two sides have different beliefs about what 
will happen at trial.”). 
 22. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 635 
(1985) (“After an educational process emphasizing the importance of preparation and the indeterminacy 
of outcomes, most lawyers will prefer to leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, they can charge 
by the stone. For an attorney anxious to avoid overlooking details and underbilling hours, more is 
always better.”).  
 23. Attorneys paid on an hourly rate might damage their reputations by extracting unnecessary 
fees in any single case. See PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW 66 
(1998) (“Lawyers who incur unnecessary costs for their clients are putting themselves at a systematic 
competitive disadvantage with lawyers who do not.”); Rhode, supra note 22, at 635 (“Depending on the 
press of other business, attorneys who charge by the hour may face considerable temptation to prolong 
certain tasks or to retain matters that they cannot complete efficiently. And clients are not always well 
situated to monitor counsels’ performance.”). 
 24. See Ingram, supra note 11, at 95 (“In most cases, defense attorneys also have little, if any, 
incentive to seek an early settlement. It is in their best interest to run up a lot of billable hours before 
achieving a result satisfactory to the client.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Charles Silver & Kent D. Syverud, 
Bargaining Impediments and Settlement Behavior, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE 
SETTLEMENT GAP 51, 51 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996) ([L]awyers foment controversy and prolong 
litigation because they make money by doing so.”). 
 25. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (1999) (“[L]itigants base at least some litigation decisions on ‘a desire 
to avoid the unpleasant psychological consequences’ of regret arising from ‘a decision that turns out 
poorly.’”) (footnote omitted). 
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suggests weakness. When both parties are represented by lawyers who feel 
that way, settlement negotiations may be deferred until the last minute.26 
Another factor that might account for some of the delay in settlements 
is that litigants might incorrectly assess the value of their case and the 
merits of settlement. Researchers have attempted to determine whether 
litigants are prone to commit cognitive errors in analyzing settlement 
choices. Empirical studies of settlement-related behavior,27 as well as a 
wealth of studies on human decisionmaking generally,28 suggest that clients 
make mistakes in thinking about their cases that distort their choices about 
whether to settle, when to settle, and on what terms to settle. 
Of course, litigants do not make decisions alone. Most litigants are 
represented by counsel.29 Although decisions about whether and when to 
settle ultimately belong to the client, lawyers play an important role in the 
settlement process. They attempt to predict the likely outcome of cases, and 
advise their clients about which settlement offers to make, when to make 
them, and which settlement proposals to accept.30 They essentially act as 
brokers facilitating the exchange of legal claims for money or other 
 
 26. Bullock & Gallagher, supra note 9, at 898 (“Many lawyers delay initiating discussion of 
compromise for fear that their actions will be viewed by their opponents as evidence of a lack of 
confidence in their position.”) (footnote omitted); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 670 (1986) (“[T]oo many lawyers view the suggestion 
of compromise as an admission of weakness and therefore delay the initiation of negotiations with the 
hope that the onus of suggesting settlement will fall on opposing counsel.”) (footnote omitted). 
 27. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 164 (demonstrating the susceptibility of 
nonlawyers to cognitive illusions when making settlement-related decisions); George Loewenstein et 
al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 158–59 
(1993) (finding that, contrary to the assumption that parties will evaluate information revealed through 
costly discovery processes in an unbiased fashion in order to settle, self-serving biases can cause parties 
to obtain what they deem fair rather than seek to maximize their own payoff, even if information is 
shared perfectly and there is a complete absence of disputed legal issues). 
 28. See generally PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION 
MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS (2010) 
(describing how cognitive errors that are common in the general population can affect lawyers). 
 29. See Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 14 
(1998) (reporting that during the period from 1991 through 1994, approximately 21 percent of federal 
civil litigants were unrepresented). 
 30. Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 214 
(1987) (“The attorney will always—or almost always—know much more about the lawsuit than the 
client. The attorney’s advice about the merits of a proposed settlement will often weigh heavily in the 
client’s decision.”); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 
MD. L. REV. 213, 217 (1991) (“Even where they think of themselves as merely providing information 
for clients to integrate into their own decisions, lawyers influence clients by myriad judgments, 
conscious or not, about what information to present, how to order it, what to emphasize, and what style 
and phrasing to adopt.”) (footnote omitted). 
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consideration.31 Their recommendations typically carry great weight.32 
Moreover, sometimes the client’s role in assessing settlement options is 
nominal.33 Lawyers, then, exert considerable influence over their clients’ 
decision about settlement. 
Lawyers might be well suited to help clients overcome their cognitive 
shortcomings, just as they help clients surmount their deficiencies in legal 
knowledge.34 Lawyers possess characteristics that differentiate them from 
most of their clients. On average, lawyers are better educated than their 
clients and have received training that might facilitate good judgment.35 
Lawyers regularly evaluate settlement proposals, and some research 
suggests that experienced lawyers provide more accurate assessments of 
case value than law students (and presumably lay people).36 Lawyers also 
likely have less emotional investment in the outcome, and can provide what 
psychologists sometimes call an “outside” perspective on choices that can 
facilitate clearer judgment.37 
On the other hand, lawyers are human beings, too. A substantial body 
of research indicates that in a wide range of decisions involving a variety of 
potential sources of cognitive errors, people with legal training and 
litigation-related experience do not consistently make better judgments 
than lay people. In two comprehensive reviews of this work, Paul Brest and 
Linda Hamilton Kreiger and Jennifer Robbennolt and Jean Sternlight 
 
 31. ROSS, supra note 13, at 77 (“Negligence work may be easily regarded as brokerage . . . .”). 
See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 
(1990) (describing lawyers as “justice brokers”).  
 32. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A 
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 186 (1977) (“[T]he client may be unduly influenced by what the lawyer, 
the ‘authority figure,’ would do . . . .”). 
 33. Miller, supra note 30, at 213 (“In some cases, effective control is almost entirely in the hands 
of the attorney.”). 
 34. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at 
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 120 (“[A]t least in some circumstances, lawyers taking an 
active role in their client’s litigation decisionmaking processes probably can affect the extent to which 
psychological factors, as opposed to the comparison of the expected financial values of alternative 
litigation options, motivate litigants’ ultimate decisions.”). 
 35. See Darrin R. Lehman, Richard O. Lempert & Richard E. Nisbett, The Effects of Graduate 
Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 440 (1988) (finding that training in psychology, medicine, and law can improve 
logical reasoning). 
 36. Jonas Jacobson et al., Predicting Civil Jury Verdicts: How Attorneys Use (and Misuse) a 
Second Opinion, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 105–06 (Supp. 2011) (reporting research showing 
that practicing lawyers provide better estimates of case value than law students). 
 37. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive 
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 29 (1993) (“[E]rrors of intuitive prediction can 
sometimes be reduced by adopting an outside view . . . .”). 
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document a wide range of situations in which lawyers might be prone to 
making serious cognitive errors of judgment.38 Brest and Kreiger not only 
laud the decisionmaking skills many lawyers possess, but they also 
conclude that “cognitive, social, and motivational phenomena . . . distort 
people’s perceptions of reality, and impede their understanding and pursuit 
of their own or their client’s goals.”39 
Research on lawyers’ judgment suggests that they are also prone to 
making errors. For example, lawyers make overly optimistic assessments of 
cases in ways that might lead them to litigate when they should settle.40 
Experienced lawyers also stubbornly ignore the suggestions of other 
experienced lawyers when assessing values, preferring to rely on their own 
estimates even though they are commonly wrong.41 Other research suggests 
that lawyers are prone to making overly risky decisions to avoid losing,42 
although related research suggests that lawyers sometimes avoid this kind 
of mistake.43  
Do lawyers facilitate good decisions or poor ones? If lawyers 
themselves make systematic errors in judgment, then not only will they fail 
 
 38. See generally BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 28; JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. 
STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, 
LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING (2012). 
 39. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 28, at 31. 
 40. Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Forecasting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher 
Probability to Possibilities That Are Described in Greater Detail, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 168–
69 (2002) (showing that lawyers are susceptible to cognitive bias in assessing the likelihood of potential 
trial outcomes); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case 
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 149 (2010) (reporting the results of a study and 
concluding that “[l]awyers frequently made substantial judgmental errors, showing a proclivity to 
overoptimism”). Law students show a similar excess of self-serving optimism about case value. 
Loewenstein, supra note 27, at 150 (reporting “strong evidence for self-serving interpretations of 
fairness” in a study of law students’ predictions of settlement amounts). 
 41. See Jacobson et al., supra note 36, at 108–09 (reporting the results of a study asking lawyers 
to estimate the value of jury verdicts and noting “[a]ttorneys could have reduced their [case estimation] 
errors even further . . . by simply averaging their own and their partners’ estimates”). 
 42. Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and 
Reservation Values, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 289, 296–97 (1995) (finding that lawyer subjects were 
just as strongly affected by framing biases in a negotiating experiment as were nonlawyer subjects). 
 43. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 34, at 137 (“Our experimental results support the hypothesis 
that lawyers, on average, evaluate litigation options differently than litigants, with lawyers’ evaluations 
more likely to be consistent with the expected value analysis presumed by economic models of 
litigation.”); id. at 113 (“Our lawyer subjects were not affected to nearly the same degree as our litigant 
[that is, college student] subjects by the framing, anchoring, and equity-seeking variables tested.”); id. 
at 82 (“Lawyers are more likely than litigants to apply an expected financial value analysis to the 
settlement-versus-trial decision, whereas certain cognitive and social-psychological phenomena that can 
distract from expected value analysis are more likely to influence litigants. In any given situation, this 
disparity could cause lawyers to be more or less inclined toward settlement than litigants.”). 
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to assist their clients, they might even make matters worse. The research 
concerning lawyers’ susceptibility to cognitive errors is thus mixed. 
Lawyers benefit from training and experience, but they are still human 
beings who might rely on misleading cognitive strategies. The previous 
research suggests that some of these cognitive strategies might prolong 
litigation in ways that could explain why cases often settle only after 
significant resources have been spent. Lawyers’ inclination to overvalue 
their cases facilitates conflict,44 as does the tendency for lawyers facing the 
potential for significant losses to make risky choices.45 
In this Article, we expand on the research indicating that misleading 
cognitive strategies for making decisions can prolong litigation. We asked 
lawyers to make judgments in (mostly) legal contexts in which misleading 
cognitive strategies might cause poor judgment. Of the five cognitive 
strategies that we explore in this Article—excessive reliance on intuition, 
the framing effect, the confirmation bias, nonconsequentialist reasoning, 
and the sunk-cost fallacy—only the framing effect has previously been 
directly studied in practicing lawyers.46 Overall, we find that lawyers are 
vulnerable to many of the same kinds of errors that likely mislead their 
clients. 
II.  THE CURRENT STUDY 
A.  METHODOLOGY AND PARTICIPANTS 
The methodology we employed to study lawyers’ decisionmaking is 
the same methodology we have used to study judicial decisionmaking for 
over a decade.47 Essentially, we attend continuing education programs for 
 
 44. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of 
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 116 (1997) (“[I]n negotiations where the costs of impasse 
are high, the self-serving bias hurts both parties economically.”). 
 45. See Randall L. Kiser, Martin A. Asher & Blakeley B. McShane, Let’s Not Make a Deal: An 
Empirical Study of Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 551, 566 (2008) (reporting a study of errors in settlement decisions and concluding that “the cost 
of decision error is higher for defendants than for plaintiffs”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and 
the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 159 (1996) (reporting the results of research on 
settlement decisions and concluding that defendants’ aggregate decisions “can only be described as 
risk-seeking”). 
 46. See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 34, at 100 (presenting the results of a study of the 
effect of framing on lawyers’ decisionmaking). 
 47. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816–18 (2001) (describing our methodological approach). We have previously 
reported research on judges in a series of papers. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. 
Wistrich, Blinking on The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Chris 
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judges or lawyers. Before presenting any of our research, we ask the 
participants at the program to respond to a questionnaire containing three to 
five hypothetical cases or other tests. We typically use a between-subjects 
experimental design;48 that is, we draft two (or more) versions of a 
hypothetical case in which one factor of interest varies and participants 
review only one version of each scenario. Differences between the 
aggregated decisions made by the two groups are thus attributable to the 
factor that we varied. We also usually ask the participants to provide 
demographic information after responding to the surveys. We do not ask 
participants to identify themselves. 
The data presented in this Article were collected at seven different 
presentations conducted by one or both of us, described below in table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical 
Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinski & 
Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the 
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B. U. L. REV. 1227 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris 
Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Probability, Probable Cause, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 72 (2011); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information?: The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 
(2005). One of us has also reported previous research on lawyers and insurance claims adjusters. Chris 
Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment and Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2017 
(2006). 
 48. For a description of between-subject experimental designs, see ROBERT M. LAWLESS, 
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 104 (2010). 
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TABLE 1.  Demographic Information on Research Participants 
Group #
a
 Type of 
conference 
Percent 
Male 
(and #)
b
 
Mean/Median 
Years of 
Experience 
(and #) 
Percent 
Republican/ 
Percent 
Democratic
c
 
Oregon  113 CLE
d
 64 (105) 17.3/17.0 (104) 19/65 
Texas 35 
Texas Bar 
Assn.
e
 
71 (35) 21.7/20.0 (35) 54/37 
Maine 38 Inn of 
Court
f
 
82 (38) 15.6/14.0 (38) ... 
Ontario 36 CLE
g
 44 (36) 15.6/14.0 (36) ... 
Insurance 107 
Firm 
Retreat 
48 (104) 15.4/15.0 (104) 
... 
Missouri  28 CLE ... ... ... 
Reinsurance 26 RIA
h
 ... ... ... 
aWe excluded all those who identified themselves as judges or as nonlawyers. 
b Not all of the lawyers answered the question about gender and experience. 
cThese do not add up to 100 percent. Those lawyers who listed themselves as “other” or did not respond 
to this question constitute the remaining percentage. Our question on political affiliation was: “Which 
of the two major political parties in the United States most closely matches your own political beliefs?” 
dThis was a day-long continuing legal education conference organized by an Oregon professional group 
that consisted mostly of defense attorneys. 
eThis was a breakout session at the annual meeting of the Texas Bar Association Conference. 
fThe Inns of Court are regional associations of lawyers and judges, who meet to “foster excellence in 
professionalism, ethics, civility, and legal skills.” Mission and Goals, AMERICANS INNS OF COURT, 
http://home.innsofcourt.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
gThis event was an hour-long session organized by Osgoode Hall Law School. We thank Professor 
Poonam Puri, of Osgoode Hall for helping organize this event 
hThese data were collected at the annual meeting of the Reinsurance Association of America. The 
participants were in attendance at the conference and consist of senior executives with insurance 
companies, many of whom were attorneys. Only the attorneys are included in these results. 
B.  PHENOMENA AND RESULTS 
1.  Excessive Reliance on Intuition 
In a previous article, we described our intuitive-override model of 
judicial decisionmaking.49 This model arose from the widely held view in 
 
 49. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench, supra note 47, at 6–9. Others have 
also applied the two-system model of decisionmaking to legal issues. See, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, 
Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
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psychology that people rely on two types of mental processes to make 
decisions: intuitive processes (“System 1”) and deliberative processes 
(“System 2”).50 As we previously explained, 
 Intuitive processes, also called “System 1” processes, “occur 
simultaneously and do not require or consume much attention.” They are 
“automatic, heuristic-based, and relatively undemanding of 
computational capacity.” Simply stated, they are “spontaneous, intuitive, 
effortless, and fast.” Emotional influences also tend to arise through 
System 1 processes. Deliberative processes, also called “System 2” 
processes, are “mental operations requiring effort, motivation, 
concentration, and the execution of learned rules.” Associated with 
“controlled processing,” they are “deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, 
and slow.” . . . The relationship between the intuitive and deliberative 
systems is complicated. Because intuition is automatic, quick, and easily 
invoked, it can easily dominate deliberation as decision makers simply 
rely on a quick, intuitive response or as intuition affects the judgments 
that follow. Intuition can be surprisingly accurate, but sometimes good 
judgment will require purging the deliberative processes of intuition’s 
influence. Intuitive responses can also emerge from repetition of the 
same deliberative procedure. Furthermore, some decisions might require 
shifting between the two systems.51 
Psychologists have shown that most people tend to rely too heavily on 
intuition in many situations.52 Our own research suggests that judges, who 
are probably somewhat more deliberative than the average person, largely 
share this characteristic.53 Furthermore, judges even tend to rely 
excessively on intuition when performing simulated judicial tasks.54 
Do lawyers also rely too heavily on intuition or are they exceptionally 
deliberative? To answer this question, we asked lawyers to take a test 
designed to measure a person’s ability to suppress an incorrect intuitive 
response and successfully override it with deliberation. The test is called 
 
2098, 2110–16 (2008) (reviewing DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES 
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008) and RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008)).  
 50. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–26 (2011). 
 51. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench, supra note 47, at 7–8 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 52. See Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 167, 167 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) 
(“[O]ne of psychology’s fundamental insights is that judgments are generally the product of 
nonconscious systems that operate quickly, on the basis of scant evidence, and in a routine manner, and 
then pass their hurried approximations to consciousness, which slowly and deliberately adjusts them.”). 
 53. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench, supra note 47, at 13–19. 
 54. Id. at 19–29. See Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, supra 
note 47, at 1217–21. 
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the “Cognitive Reflection Test” (“CRT”).55 It consists of the following 
three questions: 
(1) A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost? __ cents. 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would 
it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? __ minutes. 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in 
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
will it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? __ days.56  
Each question immediately suggests an intuitive but incorrect answer: 
ten cents, one hundred minutes, and twenty-four days, respectively. The 
correct answers, however, are five cents, five minutes, and forty-seven 
days, respectively. The key to performing well on the CRT lies in 
suppressing the incorrect intuitive answer that immediately suggests itself, 
engaging the deliberative process, and then overriding the wrong answer 
suggested by intuition with the correct answer produced by deliberation. 
Table 2 reflects the performances obtained from some of the groups of 
subjects who have taken the CRT from research that Shane Frederick has 
reported.57 The performances of the judges reflected in the chart are taken 
from studies we have conducted, some previously published.58 
 
 
 
 
 55. See Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 35 
(2005) (describing the test as measuring “the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that 
first comes to mind”). 
 56. Id. at 27 fig.1. 
 57. Id. at 29 tbl.1. 
 58. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench, supra note 47, at 13–19 (reporting 
CRT results for Florida trial court judges); Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra 
note 47, at 1495–1500 (reporting CRT results for administrative law judges). 
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TABLE 2.  Average Scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test Among 
Different Groups 
Group Average Number Correct 
MIT undergraduates 2.18 
Carnegie Mellon University 
   undergraduates 
1.51 
Harvard University undergraduates 1.43 
Florida trial judges 1.23 
Administrative law judges 1.33 
University of Michigan undergraduates 1.18 
Web-based participants 1.10 
Michigan State University 
   undergraduates 
0.79 
University of Toledo undergraduates 0.57 
 Table 2 suggests three things. First, no one performs particularly well 
on this seemingly easy test. Even the best-performing group, the MIT 
students, answered only a little more than two out of three questions 
correctly, on average. Second, the judges tested performed about as well as 
students at several of America’s leading universities, such as Harvard 
University and the University of Michigan. Third, despite their relatively 
good performances, overall the judges did not stand out as adopting an 
especially deliberative approach to such problems. They performed about 
as well as other well-educated people, which is to say, not very well. 
We also gave the CRT to four groups of lawyers: Oregon lawyers, 
Texas lawyers, Ontario lawyers, and insurance lawyers. Table 3, below, 
reports their performance. 
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TABLE 3.  Average Scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test Among 
Lawyers  
Group (and 
   Number) 
Average 
Correct 
Percent obtaining each score 
0 correct 1 correct 2 correct 3 correct 
Oregon (92)
a
 1.75 8.7 29.4 40.2 21.7 
Texas (31)
b
 1.61 25.8 19.4 22.6 32.3 
Ontario (33)
c
 1.45 24.2 33.3 15.2 27.3 
Insurance (91) 1.12 39.6 23.1 23.1 14.3 
Total (247) 1.46 24.3 26.3 28.3 21.1 
Note: In all four groups, we excluded those lawyers who did not respond to all three questions, just as 
we have done in our research on judges. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench, supra 
note 47, at 14 n.81. Shane Frederick, who gathered the nonjudge data we report in table 2, above, does 
not report whether he excluded participants who did not complete all three questions or scored blank 
responses as incorrect. Frederick, supra note 55, at 29. Our results in table 2 thus might slightly 
overstate the lawyers’ scores, relative to the college samples.  
aAmong the Oregon lawyers, twenty-one failed to respond to one or more of the CRT questions: four 
responded to none of the three questions; five responded only to the first question (four of these got it 
incorrect and one got it correct); ten responded only to the first two questions (four got them both 
incorrect; four got the first question correct and the second question incorrect; two got the first question 
incorrect and the second question correct; one got them both correct); one responded only to the second 
and third questions (getting them both incorrect); one responded only to the first and third questions 
(getting the first question incorrect and the third question correct). 
bAmong the Texas lawyers, five failed to respond to one or more of the CRT questions: two responded 
only to the first and second questions (one got them both incorrect, the other got them both correct); one 
responded only to the first and third questions (getting both incorrect); one responded only to the 
second and third questions (getting the second question correct and the third question incorrect); one did 
not return the CRT page (it may have been missing from this person’s packet). 
cAmong the Ontario lawyers, three failed to respond to one or more of the CRT questions: one 
responded to none of the three questions; one responded only to the first two questions (getting them 
both incorrect); one responded only to the second and third questions (getting them both correct). 
  Among the insurance lawyers, sixteen failed to respond to one or 
more of the CRT questions: two responded to none of the three questions; 
three responded only to the first question (two of these got it incorrect and 
one got it correct); eight responded only to the first two questions (six got 
them both incorrect; two got the first question correct and the second 
question incorrect); three responded only to the second and third questions 
(two got them both incorrect and one got them both correct). 
Comparing tables 2 and 3 reveals that lawyers perform much the same 
as judges on the CRT. In addition to scoring about as well (or as poorly), 
the pattern of responses among lawyers and judges was similar. Like the 
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judges we studied, lawyers improved from one question to the next.59 On 
the first, second, and third questions, 36.4 percent, 49.8 percent, and 59.9 
percent of the lawyers got the correct answer, respectively. As with the 
judges, the lawyers probably came to see that the questions were not as 
easy as they might seem at first, thereby triggering more deliberative 
responses on the second and third questions. Furthermore, just as with the 
judges, the lawyers who got the question wrong tended to choose the 
intuitive answer.60 Among the lawyers who got the questions wrong, 94.9 
percent (149 out of 157), 58.1 percent (seventy-two out of 124), and 62.6 
percent (sixty-two out of ninety-nine) chose the intuitive responses (ten 
cents, one hundred minutes, and twenty-four hours) to the three questions, 
respectively. 
Lawyers thus performed relatively well compared to many college 
students and other participants who have taken the test, and slightly better 
than some of the groups of judges we have tested. On the other hand, the 
lawyers did not perform especially well in absolute terms, and certainly did 
not perform as well as the MIT students. The performance of the lawyers 
on the CRT thus suggests that, like most people (including judges), lawyers 
rely heavily on intuitive rather than deliberative mental processing. This 
reliance might make them susceptible misleading intuitions that can 
facilitate poor decisionmaking and predictable errors.61 
Table 3 reveals that the four groups performed somewhat differently 
on the CRT, with the insurance lawyers scoring the lowest.62 Assessing the 
scores by demographic factors revealed that the 152 male lawyers who 
completed the three CRT questions scored an average of 1.61, as compared 
to 1.23 among the ninety-one female lawyers who completed the CRT.63 
This difference was statistically significant.64 Years of experience, 
 
 59. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench, supra note 47, at 15 (reporting that 
“judges’ performance improved as they progressed through the three questions, scoring 28.2 percent, 
44.0 percent and 50.4 percent correct on the first, second, and third questions, respectively”). 
 60. Id. at 16 (reporting, for each question, that 88.4 percent, 57.4 percent and 68.0 percent of the 
judges who answered each question incorrectly provided the intuitive responses as the wrong answers). 
 61. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 50, at 25 (“System 1 has biases, however, systematic errors that 
it is prone to make in specified circumstances.”). 
 62. Analysis of Variance (“ANOVA”) of the CRT score with the four different categories of 
lawyers produced a statistically significant result. F(3,243) = 5.75, p <.001. Throughout this Article, we 
reserve the term “significant” to denote a statistically reliable result with a probability of less than 5 
percent. Also, we treat the CRT score as a continuous, cardinal variable in all statistical analyses. 
 63. Of the 247 lawyers who completed the CRT, four did not identify their gender.  
 64. t(241) = 2.70, p <.001. Because the percentage of female judges varied by group, and the 
groups varied in terms of their CRT scores, we worried that the gender effect might be attributable to 
the variation between groups. To account for this concern, we conducted an ANOVA of the CRT score 
on gender and group, and an interaction term. Both gender and group remained as significant effects 
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however, did not correlate significantly with CRT scores.65 Nor did the 
lawyers’ political orientations produce different CRT results: the thirty-five 
Republicans scored an average of 1.66, as compared to 1.68 among the 
sixty-eight Democrats, which was not a statistically significant difference.66 
Is the heavy reliance on intuition by lawyers a problem? That depends. 
Intuition can produce very good judgments, at least in some situations.67 
The difficulty, though, is that intuition often rests on a weak foundation or 
is simply misguided. Therefore, while intuition is a necessary part of good 
judgment,68 it should be double checked with deliberation, if possible.69 
Unchecked intuition leaves decisionmakers vulnerable to cognitive biases 
and errors. 
Ability and willingness to second-guess intuition seems likely to affect 
tasks other than just the CRT. People who do well on the CRT might be 
better than those who do poorly at avoiding at least some kinds of cognitive 
errors. At least one study suggests as much.70 Although the connection 
between suppression of intuition and the ability to avoid reliance on 
misleading cognitive strategies is an active area of research, we know of no 
existing studies indicating that higher CRT results correlate with avoiding 
the misleading cognitive processes we studied. Nevertheless, we examined 
the extent to which the lawyers who performed poorly on the CRT tended 
to rely more heavily on the misleading intuitions we studied. To presage 
our results, we found no correlation between the lawyers’ CRT scores and 
their tendency to rely on misleading intuitions.71 
 
(F(1, 235) = 3.82, p = .05 for gender and F(3, 235) = 5.31, p = .002 for group), and the interaction term 
was not significant (F(3, 235) = 0.74, p = .53). This result suggests that the differences between the 
groups and between male and female participants are both independent effects. 
 65. r = -.09, which is not a significant correlation. t(240) = 1.46, p = .14. 
 66. t(99) = .12, p = .91. As noted in table 1, supra, we only asked lawyers in Oregon and Texas 
to provide their political affiliations. 
 67. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 17 (2005) (“[T]here can be as much value in the blink of 
an eye as in months of rational analysis”). 
 68. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 50, at 28 (“Constantly questioning our own thinking would be 
impossibly tedious, and System 2 is much too slow and inefficient to serve as a substitute for System 1 
in making routine decisions.”). 
 69. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 246 (2012) (“A wise 
decision requires reflection, and reflection requires a pause.”). 
 70. Jörg Oechssler, Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral 
Biases, 72 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 147, 149–50 (2009) (reporting that people who score well on the 
CRT avoid the conjunction fallacy, avoid base-rate fallacies, exhibit consistent time preferences, and 
avoid overconfidence). More elaborate measures of cognitive ability correlate with an inclination to 
avoid some misleading intuitive cognitive processes. See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, 
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate? 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 
645, 658–60 (2000). 
 71. We found nonsignificant trends for such correlations in our studies of the confirmation bias 
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2.  Framing Effect 
Any gallery owner will confirm that choosing the proper frame can 
make an enormous difference in the appearance of a painting. Some frames 
enhance a painting, while others leave it looking drab.72 Cognitive frames 
can have a similar effect on choice. 
People do not evaluate choices and options without reference to 
surrounding context. Among many contextual influences on choice, people 
make decisions about value and risk with respect to a reference point, such 
as the status quo.73 Economically equivalent options appear different, and 
depending on the context, frame the choice as reflecting potential gains or 
losses from the status quo.74 As we previously have explained, 
 When people confront risky decisions—such as deciding whether to 
settle a case or to proceed to trial—they categorize their decision options 
as potential gains or losses from a salient reference point such as the 
status quo. This categorization, or “framing,” of decision options 
influences the way people evaluate options and affects their willingness 
to incur risk. People tend to make risk-averse decisions when choosing 
between options that appear to represent gains and risk-seeking decisions 
when choosing between options that appear to represent losses. For 
example, most people prefer a certain $100 gain to a 50% chance of 
winning $200 but prefer a 50% chance of losing $200 to a certain $100 
loss.75 
The framing effect is a cognitive error because it leads people to 
violate a fundamental characteristic of rationality—namely, invariance.76 
 
and nonconsequentialist reasoning. The lack of statistically reliable correlations, however, does not 
mean that a tendency to rely on intuitive reasoning is not connected to these errors, however. Our 
sample sizes were likely too small to detect the kinds of statistical interactions that such an effect might 
produce. Also, the CRT is a crude (albeit compelling) measure of the tendency to rely on intuitive 
reasoning. A more precise measure would be useful to study the connection between a general tendency 
to rely too heavily on intuition and a vulnerability to relying on misleading intuitions in specific 
settings. 
 72. Karla Klein Albertson, Art 101: The Wrong Frame Does an Artwork No Favors, AUCTION 
CTR. NEWS INT’L (Nov. 11, 2009, 3:42 PM), http://acn.liveauctioneers.com/index.php/component/ 
content/article/70-acn-staff/1653-art-101-the-wrong-frame-does-a-painting-no-favors?format=pdf. 
 73. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277–79 (1979). 
 74. Mathew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 36 (1998) (framing 
occurs when two “logically equivalent (but not transparently equivalent) statements of a problem lead 
decision makers to choose different options”). 
 75. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 47, at 794 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 76. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 
343–44 (1984) (describing how framing effects violate invariance). 
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Taking the sure option or gambling are both defensible choices, but making 
a different choice based on the difference in frame is not. Cosmetic 
differences in the descriptions of substantively identical options should not 
cause people to prefer one over the other.77 Nevertheless, as we noted, 
people make cautious choices when assessing gains and risky choices when 
facing losses.78 
The framing of decisions as gains or losses has a potent influence on 
judgment.79 Framing even affects experts when the stakes are enormous.80 
For example, an extensive analysis of putting by professional golfers 
revealed that framing influences their strategies while competing for 
monetary prizes in tournaments.81 Even though golfers win tournaments by 
having the lowest total score, golfers putting for a “birdie” (below par, 
which would constitute a gain from the status quo) putt cautiously and 
commonly leave the ball short of the hole, while those putting to avoid a 
“bogey” (above par, which would constitute a “loss” from the status quo) 
putt aggressively and commonly run the ball well past the hole.82 
Litigation provides a natural frame for settlement decisions. Plaintiffs 
generally choose between gains (a certain gain by settling or the prospect 
of winning more at trial) while defendants generally choose between losses 
(a certain loss by settling or the risk of losing more at trial).83 Several 
studies indicate that merely assigning subjects to assess settlement 
proposals from the perspective of either the plaintiff or the defendant 
causes them to view the proposals differently. In an experiment using law 
students as subjects, one of us found that 77 percent of plaintiff-subjects 
(who were choosing between gains), but only 31 percent of defendant-
 
 77. See id. at 343 (“Invariance requires that such changes in the description of outcomes should 
not alter the preference order.”). 
 78. Id. at 344. (“[A] large majority of subjects made a risk averse choice for the sure gain over 
the positive gamble in the first decision, and an even larger majority of subjects made a risk seeking 
choice for the gamble over the sure loss in the second decision.”). 
 79. See Ayanna K. Thomas & Peter R. Millar, Reducing the Framing Effect in Older and 
Younger Adults by Encouraging Analytical Processing, 67 J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. 139, 139 
(2011) (“[T]he bias that results from framing has been shown to be one of the most robust biases in 
human decision making.”) (citation omitted). 
 80. See Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 124–25. 
 81. See Devon G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias 
in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 129, 155 (2011) 
(“Although professional golfers should strive to hit each putt as accurately as possible, golfers hit birdie 
putts (in the domain of ‘gains’) less accurately and less hard than they hit par putts (in the domain of 
‘losses’).”). 
 82. Id. at 130 (“This finding is consistent with loss aversion; players invest more focus when 
putting for par to avoid encoding a loss.”). 
 83. Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 118–19, 129. 
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subjects (who were choosing between losses), believed that an 
economically equivalent settlement offer should be accepted.84 Similarly, 
in a set of three experiments using college undergraduates as subjects, 
gains-frame subjects who evaluated a settlement proposal from the 
plaintiff’s perspective consistently found the proposal more attractive than 
did loss-frame subjects, even though the settlement proposals were 
economically equivalent.85 Finally, in a study using college students and 
trial attorneys as subjects, researchers found that those assigned to evaluate 
a settlement proposal from the plaintiff’s perspective consistently provided 
risk-averse reservation prices and were willing to accept 10 to 20 percent 
less in settlement than the expected value of the litigated outcome.86 Those 
assigned to evaluate a settlement proposal from the defendant’s 
perspective, by contrast, displayed the opposite tendency.87 
These experiments demonstrate that clients are likely to be subject to 
the framing effect when evaluating settlement proposals. If they are to 
make wise decisions about whether to settle, many will need help in 
surmounting the distortion it produces. Are lawyers well equipped to 
provide such assistance? We wanted to try to answer this question. 
To determine whether lawyers resist the framing effect in a litigation 
context, we gave a framing problem to four groups: the Maine lawyers, the 
insurance lawyers, the reinsurance lawyers, and the Ontario lawyers. Our 
materials informed the lawyers that they were representing one of two 
corporate parties in a case alleging copyright infringement.88 The materials 
indicated that the plaintiff would recover $200,000 if successful, that the 
plaintiff had a 50 percent chance of success, and that each party would 
incur $50,000 in nonrecoverable litigation expenses if the case did not 
settle. We randomly assigned half of the lawyers to represent the plaintiff 
and the other half to represent the defendant. Each party received a “take it 
or leave it” settlement offer. We then asked the lawyers whether their client 
should accept the offer. The lawyers representing the plaintiff learned that 
the defendant had offered to pay $60,000 to settle the case; the lawyers 
assigned to represent the defendant learned that the plaintiff had demanded 
a payment of $140,000 to settle the case. From the plaintiff’s perspective, 
the expected value of a trial is equal to $50,000 (0.50 times $200,000 
minus the expected expenses of $50,000), so the $60,000 offer is $10,000 
 
 84. Id. at 128–29. 
 85. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 129–38. 
 86. Babcock et al., supra note 42, at 293–97. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See infra, Appendix I. 
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better than the expected value of litigating. From the defendant’s 
perspective, the expected value of a trial is equal to negative $150,000 
(0.50 times $200,000 minus the expected expenses of $50,000), so the 
$140,000 offer is $10,000 better than the expected value of litigating. 
Because both offers exceed the expected value of proceeding to trial by 
$10,000, the offers should have been equally attractive if lawyers were 
immune to the framing effect. 
The results showed, however, that framing influenced the lawyers’ 
evaluations of the settlement offer. Among the lawyers assigned to 
represent the plaintiff, 43.9 percent (twenty-five out of fifty-seven) found 
the settlement attractive, compared to just 23.5 percent (twelve out of fifty-
one) of the lawyers assigned to represent the defendant. This difference 
was statistically significant.89 For the lawyers assigned to represent the 
plaintiff, the settlement offer was framed as a choice between gains, 
rendering them more risk averse and thus more willing to accept the offer 
than their defense-counsel counterparts. This frame made the settlement 
seem more attractive, even though the settlement had the same economic 
advantages for both parties. Neither the lawyer’s years of experience, 
gender, nor CRT score had any effect on the willingness to settle overall, or 
on the influence of the frame.90 
 
 89. Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .04. Fisher’s Exact Test computes the precise probability that you 
would see a given pattern in the data simply as a result of chance. See LAWLESS, ROBBENNOLT & ULEN, 
supra note 48, at 258. 
 90. Because we did not ask for the gender or experience of the lawyers from the reinsurance 
group and the Missouri insurance group, these two were omitted from the analysis for these two 
demographic factors. Because we only had CRT scores available for the Ontario lawyers, only this 
group was used to assess the influence of the CRT. 
  Throughout this paper, for the three phenomena on which we presented two different 
scenarios to create an experimental manipulation (framing, nonconsequentialist reasoning, and the 
sunk-cost fallacy) we assessed the differential effect of the phenomenon on any of the demographic 
variables available for the different groups. In all instances, we did this by conducting separate logistic 
regressions of the lawyers’ choices (in this case, the decision regarding whether to settle) on three 
parameters: the experimental condition, the demographic factors, and an interaction term of the 
experimental condition by the demographic factor. We reported the results of any statistical test that 
yielded a significant result on the coefficient for the effect of the demographic factor or the interaction. 
A significant result on the interaction term would indicate that the experimental condition had a 
differential effect on lawyers of different demographic backgrounds. Assessment of the influence of 
demographic factors on the CRT score and on the confirmation bias is straightforward (and identified in 
accompanying footnotes), owing to the lack of an experimental manipulation. 
  For the framing study, this means that we assessed participants of different genders, levels of 
experience, and with different CRT scores by conducting three separate logistic regressions of the 
settlement decision on each of these three factors and an interaction of the factor, the frame, and an 
interaction term. None of the three factors we examined produced a significant coefficient (z-statistics = 
0.66, 0.19, and 0.23 for experience, gender, and CRT score, respectively) or a significant coefficient for 
the interaction term (z-statistics = 1.51, 1.38, and 0.14 for experience, gender, and CRT score, 
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Judges are also vulnerable to framing. In a previously published 
experiment, we gave 163 federal magistrate judges a similar problem. They 
displayed roughly the same susceptibility to framing. Among the judges 
evaluating the case from the plaintiff’s perspective, 40 percent (thirty-three 
out of eighty-three) indicated that the plaintiff should accept the 
defendant’s $60,000 settlement offer, but only 25 percent (twenty out of 
eighty) of the judges evaluating the case from the defendant’s perspective 
indicated that the defendant should pay the plaintiff’s $140,000 settlement 
demand.91 
The size of the framing effect for the lawyers and the judges was 
comparable. This is perhaps not surprising, because all the judges in our 
research were former practicing lawyers. The results suggest that some 
experience as a lawyer reduces the tendency to rely on the misleading 
intuition that framing creates. Though susceptible to framing, lawyers and 
judges are less vulnerable than law students (and, by analogy, other 
nonlawyers).92 Assessing the case from a judge’s perspective, however, 
does not reduce the influence of framing any further. 
The result of our experiment is also consistent with previous studies 
exploring the quality of attorney-client choices about settlement by 
comparing them to actual adjudicated outcomes in the same cases. Several 
studies of settlement decisions in actual cases suggest that defendants adopt 
riskier settlement strategies than plaintiffs.93 Risk-seeking defendants seem 
to reject settlement proposals that they would be better off accepting, 
thereby promoting litigation.94 Risk aversion among plaintiffs, by contrast, 
promotes settlements. Whether the net effect of framing promotes or 
impedes litigation is unclear, but at least one party is apt to adopt a 
perspective that promotes litigation. 
 
respectively). The analysis of interactions produced two notable trends, however, that approached 
statistical significance. First, experience reduced the size of the framing effect. Second, male lawyers 
showed a smaller framing effect than female lawyers; this result occurred largely because only one of 
the fifteen female lawyers analyzing the case from the defendant’s perspective settled (meaning only 
6.7 percent settled). 
 91. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 47, at 796–97. 
 92. Framing had less influence on lawyers and judges than on law students. Rachlinski, supra 
note 45, at 128–29 (reporting a 46 percent shift among law students between the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s perspective, using similar materials). 
 93. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and 
the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 378 (1991); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. 
Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlements, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 55 
(1996); Kiser, Asher & McShane, supra note 45, at 589–90; Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 158–59. 
 94. See Kiser, Asher & McShane, supra note 45, at 566–67; Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 158–
59. 
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The best strategy for mitigating the impact of framing is to evaluate a 
potential settlement through multiple frames.95 Choices often can be 
characterized as either gains or losses. For example, in our experiment, the 
defendants’ decision about whether to incur a loss by paying $140,000 to 
settle the case can instead be characterized as a decision about whether to 
achieve a gain of $10,000 over the expected value of continuing to litigate 
the case. Reframing might not give a party a clear answer as to whether to 
settle, but it can weaken the force of an arbitrary antisettlement frame. 
Another possible mechanism for debiasing is simply to encourage 
deliberation. Some simple math identifies the value of the settlement offers 
in our study. Lawyers’ susceptibility to excessive reliance on intuition, as 
reflected in their CRT scores, however, might prevent them from utilizing 
this strategy as effectively, or as frequently, as they should.96 Similarly, 
generating alternative frames can be difficult, because cognitive illusions 
create sticky misconceptions. Settlement judges or other mediators can help 
by using their skill and experience, as well as the objectivity resulting from 
their lack of involvement in the case, to share with the litigants and their 
lawyers other perspectives relevant to the evaluation of settlement 
proposals, although as we have noted, judges seem susceptible to framing 
as well. Lawyers, judges, and mediators all need to recognize the influence 
of framing in order to overcome it, and work to suppress their intuitive 
reactions. 
3.  Confirmation Bias 
Beliefs persist.97 People frequently do not test their beliefs fairly and 
vigorously, but rather seek out information consistent with what they 
already believe.98 This observation about human nature is not new; Sir 
Francis Bacon described this tendency centuries ago: 
The human understanding, once it has adopted opinions, either because 
they were already accepted and believed, or because it likes them, draws 
 
 95. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 47, at 822–23. 
 96. Thomas & Millar, supra note 79, at 146 (“Our results suggest that the framing effect can be 
overcome if participants are encouraged to engage in more effortful analytic processes.”). 
 97. See Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in Self-Perception and 
Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 880 (1975) (“[O]nce formed, impressions are remarkably perseverant and 
unresponsive to new input, even when such input logically negates the original basis for the 
impressions.”). 
 98. Anthony Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 
35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603, 606 (1980) (“[P]eople manage knowledge in a variety of ways to promote the 
selective availability of information that confirms judgments already arrived at.”). 
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everything else to support and agree with them. And though it may meet 
a greater number and weight of contrary instances, it will, with great and 
harmful prejudice, ignore or condemn or exclude them by introducing 
some distinction, in order that the authority of those earlier assumptions 
may remain intact and unharmed.99 
Modern psychology confirms that people commonly “interpret 
subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs.”100 Once a 
hypothesis is formed, people seek information that supports it and overlook 
the relevance and importance of information that suggests it might be 
wrong.101 This confirmation bias predisposes people “not merely to 
interpret evidence in a self-fulfilling manner, but to seek out evidence 
supporting only one side of a polarized issue.”102 Part of the reason for this 
bias is that testing a belief requires engaging in an effortful “System 2” 
process involving assimilating contrary information.103 It is far easier to 
rely on “System 1,” which will seek out, remember, and emphasize 
consistent information while ignoring, forgetting, or reinterpreting 
inconsistent information.104 Even though a falsifying test strategy usually 
yields superior results, people are disinclined to adopt it.105 
The most widely discussed demonstration of the confirmation bias in 
an empirical setting was conducted with abstract materials created by Peter 
Wason.106 In a typical version of this study, Wason shows people four 
 
 99. FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM § 46 at 57 (Peter Urbach & John Gibson eds. & trans., 
Open Court Publ’g Co. 1998) (1620). 
 100. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979). 
 101. Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors That Aggravate and Counteract 
Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 316–17 (2010). 
 102. Scott O. Lilienfeld, Rachel Ammirati & Kristin Landfield, Giving Debiasing Away: Can 
Psychological Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?, 4 PERSP. PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 390, 392 (2009). 
 103. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 50, at 81 (“The operations of associative memory contribute to a 
general confirmation bias.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 104. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593–94 (2006) (“Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek to 
confirm, rather than disconfirm, any hypothesis under study.”) (footnote omitted); Raymond S. 
Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 
175 (1998) (defining confirmation bias as “unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of 
evidence”); O’Brien, supra note 101, at 316 (describing confirmation bias as “the tendency to bolster a 
hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence”). 
 105. See Nickerson, supra note 104, at 211 (“In the aggregate, the evidence seems to me fairly 
compelling that people do not naturally adopt a falsifying strategy of hypothesis testing.”). 
 106. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 231–33 (1993) 
(reviewing the work done by Peter Wason). 
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cards, each bearing one of the following symbols: “E,” “K,” “4” and “7.” 
He informs the participants that each card displays a letter on one side and 
a number on the other side. He then asks the participants which card or 
cards, if any, they would need to turn over to determine whether the 
statement, “[i]f a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number 
on the other side,” is accurate.107 The correct answer to this question is “E” 
and “7”. On reflection, it is easy to see why. An odd number on the other 
side of the “E” card, or a vowel on the other side of the “7” card, would 
falsify the statement. The statement, however, says nothing about what is 
on the other side of a card displaying an even number, so, turning over the 
“4” card would accomplish nothing. Neither a vowel nor a consonant on its 
other side would falsify the statement. Similarly, the statement indicates 
nothing about what is on the other side of a card displaying a consonant, so 
turning over the “K” card is equally unnecessary. People perform poorly on 
this task. The most common response is “E” and “4” followed by those 
who answer only with “E.”108 The majority of respondents thus choose to 
turn over cards that were capable of confirming the statement, but fewer 
than 5 percent correctly answer “E” and “7.”109 
The abstract nature of the Wason card selection task arguably limits 
the generality of the finding.110 The card task does not include the kinds of 
contextual cues that can facilitate sound reasoning in more realistic 
settings. Wason himself noted that realistic content facilitates accurate 
reasoning on the task.111 Other researchers have found that converting the 
Wason card selection task into more natural or familiar scenarios 
sometimes improves performance.112 Even in naturalistic settings, however, 
the bias persists.113 In fact, some settings encourage the confirmation bias 
 
 107. Id. at 231. 
 108. Id. at 231–32. 
 109. Id. at 232. 
 110. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE 
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163, 183 (Jerome 
H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby eds., 1992) (“[H]uman reasoning changes dramatically 
depending on the subject matter one is reasoning about.”). 
 111. P.C. Wason & Diana Shapiro, Natural and Contrived Experience in a Reasoning Problem, 
23 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 63, 69 (1971) (discussing the “relative success of realistic material in 
allowing insight to be gained into the problem”). 
 112. See Nickerson, supra note 104, at 184 (“Several experiments have shown that performance 
of the selection task tends to be considerably better when the problem is couched in familiar situational 
terms rather than abstractly . . . .”). 
 113. See Erica Dawson, Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, Motivated Reasoning and 
Performance on the Wason Selection Task, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379, 1380 
(2002) (noting that “[p]roviding familiar thematic content seems to improve performance to a modest 
extent,” but observing that the effectiveness of other transformations of the Wason card selection task is 
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because people are highly motivated to identify information that is 
consistent with beliefs that are important to them.114 
Lawyers’ familiarity with the legal setting might provide the social 
cues that facilitate better reasoning processes, but motivation might 
interfere with this advantage. Lawyers want to win, too; sometimes even 
more so than clients.115 After all, lawyers’ professional obligations require 
them to find support for their clients’ positions.116 Their alignment with 
their clients might heighten their susceptibility to the confirmation bias.117 
Some research suggests, in fact, that the environment in which prosecutors 
work encourages the confirmation bias.118 On the other hand, lawyers 
might be able to maintain at least some psychological distance and 
objectivity from their client’s position. In making strategic decisions such 
as whether to settle a civil case, and in choosing which evidence to collect 
and present, lawyers need to be able to view the evidence dispassionately 
and logically in order to make good choices. 
To determine whether lawyers are susceptible to the confirmation 
bias, we administered a variation of the Wason card selection task with a 
context that lawyers might have to confront in a lawsuit.119 We asked the 
Oregon lawyers to imagine that they were representing a female plaintiff 
who was alleging gender discrimination in the employment context. The 
complaint, they were told, alleged that “male managers never promote 
 
“mixed” and “controversial”). 
 114. See id. at 1385 (“Favorable propositions appear to elicit a search for confirmation; 
unfavorable propositions elicit a search for disconfirmation.”). 
 115. See Donald J. Kochan, Thinking Like Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an “Attitude of 
Suspended Conclusion” Lost on Lawyers?, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 51 (2011) (“Given the lawyer’s 
role as zealous advocate with an occupational commitment to a client’s position, the risk of 
confirmation bias seems high—we want to win for our clients; we are required to zealously defend their 
position; and we begin our task searching for the ways to win for that predetermined position.”). 
 116. See Nickerson, supra note 104, at 175 (“An attorney’s job is to make a case for one or the 
other side of a legal dispute.”). 
 117. See Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory 
Bias, 114 Q.J. ECON. 37, 63 (1999) (discussing overconfidence in a principal-agent relationship, which 
suggests that lawyers may be more prone to overconfidence caused by confirmation bias than clients). 
Variations in the motivations to reach certain conclusions about the task can also affect accuracy. See 
Dawson, Gilovich & Regan, supra note 113, at 1382–83.  
 118. See Eric Rassin, Anita Eerland & Ilse Kuijpers, Let’s Find the Evidence: An Analogue Study 
of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 7 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER 
PROFILING 231, 238 (2010) (reporting the results of a study in which law students were asked to 
determine the guilt of a suspect in a case study and told they could order additional investigation: 
“[P]articipants who believed that the suspect was innocent looked for information confirming that he, 
indeed, was innocent. On the other hand, participants who believed that the suspect was guilty were 
more interested in investigations aimed at gathering more evidence of guilt.”). 
 119. See infra, Appendix II. 
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female employees to the position of software engineer.” The defendant had 
withheld some personnel files, arguing that the files were irrelevant and 
burdensome to produce. The materials indicated that the plaintiff then filed 
a motion to compel the defendant to locate the files necessary to answer 
interrogatories. The missing four personnel files with the missing necessary 
information were described as follows: 
(A) the file of employee whose gender is unknown, who was recently 
promoted by a male supervisor; 
(B) the file of employee whose gender is unknown, who was recently 
promoted by a female supervisor; 
(C) the file of male employee, who was recently promoted by a 
supervisor whose gender is unknown; or 
(D) the file of female employee, who was recently promoted by a 
supervisor whose gender is unknown. 
 We asked the participants to “identify the file or files that must be 
examined to determine if the plaintiff’s allegation that ‘male managers 
never promote female employees to the position of software engineer’ is 
likely to be true or false.” We also admonished them to avoid excessive 
discovery by instructing them as follows: “Do not identify any more files 
than are absolutely necessary.” 
Although this problem has the same structure as the Wason card 
selection task, the Oregon lawyers performed surprisingly well. Among the 
lawyers who completed this problem (two left it blank), 25.2 percent 
(twenty-eight of 111) selected the correct two files. Although that compares 
favorably to the performance of most of those who have responded to the 
Wason card selection tasks,120 it still means that 75 percent of the lawyers 
answered the question incorrectly. 
The superior performance of the Oregon lawyers on this task relative 
to the overall performance usually observed on the Wason task was not due 
to the materials alone. We gave similar materials to judges, who scored 
much worse; only 14.2 percent (twenty out of 141) of the judges got the 
problem correct.121 The difference between the lawyers and judges was 
statistically significant.122 We also gave half of the judges the classic 
 
 120. See Dawson, Gilovich & Regan, supra note 113, at 1380 (“[T]he success rate of the typical 
[Wason task] study is only around 20%.”) (citation omitted). 
 121. We asked two different groups of judges to respond to this task: a group of newly elected 
judges attending New York State’s educational session for new judges and a group of judges in Ohio 
attending the state’s annual educational conference. 
 122. Fisher’s Exact Test, p < .04. 
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version of the Wason card selection task, and they performed as poorly as 
most groups; only 8.1 percent (ten out of 123) answered the problem 
correctly. Although the judges performed better with the natural context 
than with the abstract context of the classic Wason card selection task, this 
difference was not statistically significant.123 Thus, the combination of the 
context plus the lawyers’ perspective improved performance. 
Among the lawyers, several variables predicted answering correctly to 
a statistically significant extent. Years of experience correlated 
negatively,124 meaning that older lawyers were less likely to choose the 
correct answer. Women were more likely to answer correctly than men: 37 
percent (fourteen out of thirty-eight) versus 15 percent (ten out of sixty-
six), respectively.125 Democrats were more likely to get it right than 
Republicans: 31 percent (twenty out of sixty-four) versus 9 percent (two 
out of twenty-two), respectively.126 Those who did better on the CRT were 
more likely to answer correctly: 25 percent, 19 percent, 22 percent, and 40 
percent got it right among those who got zero, one, two, and three CRT 
questions correct, respectively. This trend was not significant, however.127 
 The following table is the pattern of responses we obtained from the 
111 lawyers who responded. 
 
 
 
 
 123. Fisher’s Exact Test, p < .17. 
 124. r =-.34; t(101) = 3.63, p < .001. 
 125. Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .02. Only 104 of the 111 lawyers who responded to the Wason task 
also identified their gender. 
 126. Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .05. Only 11 of the lawyers who responded to the Wason task also 
identified their political affiliation as Democrat or Republican; the rest did not respond or selected 
“other.” 
 127. r = .14, t(89) = 1.33, p =.19. 
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TABLE 4.  Pattern of Responses on the Confirmation Bias Problem 
Answer Number selecting Percent selecting 
None  2 1.8 
A  9 8.1 
A and B  3 2.7 
A and C 3 2.7 
C  9 8.1 
A, B, and C  1 0.9 
D  10 9.0 
A and D
a
 28 25.2 
A, B, and D 3 2.7 
C and D 9 8.1 
A, C, and D 15 13.5 
All  19 17.1 
aThis is the correct response. 
 The distribution of errors seems bewildering, but some interesting 
patterns emerge. The errors can be summarized as follows: 21.6 percent 
failed to select file A; 23.4 percent incorrectly selected file B; 50.4 percent 
incorrectly selected file C; and 24.3 percent failed to select file D. The 
lawyers found the problem difficult, but they were not answering 
randomly. Selecting unnecessary files was a more common error than 
failing to select needed files. More than half of the lawyers committed the 
classic mistake that the confirmation bias suggests, by choosing file C. In 
contrast, fewer than a quarter failed to select A, and a similar percentage 
failed to select D. Overall, 55.9 percent of the lawyers selected a file that 
they did not need (B or C or both), while only 41.9 percent failed to select 
one (or both) of the two files that they needed (A or D). 
These results clearly demonstrate the influence of the confirmation 
bias on lawyers in a legal setting. The intuitive reaction of the lawyers in 
this study was to insist on more evidence than they actually needed. 
Because much of the cost of producing an excess of information is borne 
by the party producing the information, rather than by the requesting party, 
lawyers receive little feedback from which they might learn more cost-
effective intuitions. In fact, more experienced lawyers in our sample 
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displayed an even greater confirmation bias than younger attorneys. Our 
results with judges also suggest that judges will be unlikely to serve as 
effective gatekeepers, as they seem to share the same proclivity as lawyers. 
Our scenario, though more naturalistic than the abstract version of the 
Wason card selection task, nevertheless remains somewhat artificial. For 
example, in a real case, plaintiff’s counsel might want to examine file C 
because if the male employee was promoted by a male supervisor, it would 
be an instance in which a male supervisor did not promote a female 
employee. Such evidence, although not logically necessary to confirm or 
disconfirm the allegation, might be viewed as relevant.128 The context of 
civil discovery, with its broad scope perhaps encourages that kind of 
reasoning.129 Moreover, all of the files would be needed to address the 
more common allegation that the male managers are more likely to 
promote male employees. 
Our materials also might not have contained the kind of thematic 
information that facilitates accurate judgment. Researchers have found that 
versions of the Wason card selection task that test familiar social rules 
produce decisions that avoid confirmation bias.130 For example, when 
asked to assess whether the rule that one must be twenty-one in order to 
drink alcohol is being followed, people understand that they must check the 
age of everyone drinking alcohol and the beverages of anyone under the 
age of twenty-one.131 People do not check the beverages of people over 
twenty-one or the age of anyone drinking nonalcoholic beverages. The 
familiar rule facilitates accurate inquiries. 
We did not test rule-based contexts with lawyers, but expect that 
 
 128. Wason suggested that participants might be looking for statistical tendencies in the abstract 
context as well, essentially assuming that the task calls for inductive logic, even though it calls for 
deductive logic. Wason & Shapiro, supra note 111, at 70 (“[The subjects] may, in fact, have regarded 
the cards as items in a sample from a larger universe, and reasoned about them inductively rather than 
deductively.”). 
 129. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) 
(“[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their 
purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials.”) (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 
104, 114–15 (1964)). 
 130. See Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 110, at 183 (describing a version of the Wason card 
selection task involving a violation of a concrete social rule in which 75 percent of the participants 
answered correctly); Roger L. Dominowski, Content Effects in Wason’s Selection Task, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON THINKING AND REASONING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PETER WASON 41, 47–48 
(Stephen E. Newstead & Jonathan St. B. T. Evans eds., 1995) (noting that putting the Wason card 
selection task into the context of a rule violation facilitates sound reasoning about the task). 
 131. See id.  
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lawyers and judges would also perform well on tasks in which uncovering 
a cheater or lawbreaker is important. The context we used, however, is both 
familiar and important to any litigator. Knowing what evidence to gather in 
discovery and what evidence is unnecessary is critical to efficient 
investigation of civil disputes. Unfortunately, lawyers (and judges) seem to 
prefer to gather more evidence than they need. 
The influence of the confirmation bias on decisionmaking about 
discovery can increase the costs of litigation in several ways. Demanding 
unnecessary information obviously raises the costs of discovery itself. 
Worse yet, parties might be exposing themselves only to confirmatory 
information as they procure evidence, thereby inducing overconfidence in 
their positions. Furthermore, the confirmation bias can lead litigants to 
interpret conflicting information in biased, self-serving ways as they 
process only the positive aspects of any ambiguous information.132 
Research indicates, in fact, that obtaining what looks like confirmatory 
evidence can bolster the decisionmaker’s confidence even though the 
additional information might not be relevant.133 The confirmation bias can 
thus produce an excessively optimistic perception of the merits of a case. 
How can lawyers avoid the confirmation bias? Although awareness of 
the bias might help, a serious effort to avoid the bias requires changing how 
lawyers evaluate a case. The bias arises from a reliance on the cognitive 
mechanisms that people naturally use to gather supporting evidence in 
support of a belief. In other words, the bias arises precisely from the 
process of building one’s case. Avoiding the bias requires separating the 
process of building a case from the process of evaluating a case. In 
particular, evaluating a case from the opposing perspective and marshaling 
evidence for the opposite position can reduce the confirmation bias.134 
 
 132. See Rabin & Schrag, supra note 117, at 71 (“Each litigant will interpret the evidence through 
the prism of his or her own beliefs, and each may conclude that the evidence supports his or her case.”). 
 133. See Lord, Ross & Lepper, supra note 100, at 2105 (“The net effect of exposing proponents 
and opponents of capital punishment to identical evidence—studies ostensibly offering equivalent 
levels of support and disconfirmation—was to increase further the gap between their views.”); 
Nickerson, supra note 104, at 186 (“[T]he confirmation bias should be thought of as a tendency to seek 
evidence that increases one’s confidence in a hypothesis regardless of whether it should.”); Rabin & 
Schrag, supra note 117, at 38–39 (arguing that the confirmation bias may increase confidence as more 
information is collected, regardless of whether the information is confirmatory or disconfirmatory). 
 134. See Lilienfeld, Ammirati & Landfield, supra note 102, at 393 (reporting that studies have 
“found that ‘consider-the-opposite’ or ‘consider-an-alternative’ strategies can be at least somewhat 
effective in combating confirmation bias”); Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper & Elizabeth Preston, 
Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984) (presenting research indicating that “the cognitive strategy of considering 
opposite possibilities promoted impartiality”); O’Brien, supra note 101, at 317 (“One way to reduce 
preference for hypothesis-consistent information is to instruct people to consider an alternative 
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Attempting to avoid confirmation by considering the opposite 
position, however, is more easily said than done.135 Asking a member of 
the litigation team to act as a “devil’s advocate” can be helpful.136 
Although there is some evidence that a devil’s advocate can be effective,137 
the technique is most effective when it facilitates sincere (rather than 
contrived) critical examination or dissent from group members.138 
Alternatively, lawyers might establish a process in which a lawyer or a 
committee of lawyers takes a “fresh look” at a file without being tainted by 
previous views of the case.
 
Similarly, clients should consider retaining 
settlement counsel.139 If they do so, they should retain a true “outsider” 
who is not affiliated with the litigation counsel. An attorney hired solely as 
a settlement counsel can contribute a truly fresh perspective, neither tainted 
by prior discovery or motion practice nor swayed by a personal stake in the 
outcome. 
Without such measures, the confirmation bias can stimulate further 
litigation. Not only can the bias lead lawyers to demand unnecessary 
discovery, but the extra evidence can increase their overconfidence.  
 
hypothesis or why a favored hypothesis is wrong.”) (citation omitted). 
 135. See Charlan Jeanne Nemeth et. al., Improving Decision Making by Means of Dissent, 31 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 49 (2001). (“[T]here are literally hundreds of studies documenting how 
difficult it is for people to seriously question their own judgment, especially when that judgment is 
bolstered by consensus.”) (citation omitted). 
 136. See id. at 49 (“The role of [a devil’s advocate] is to vigorously criticize plans under 
consideration by a group. The hope is that such dissent will thwart the rush to judgment and instead 
foster discussion, a consideration of more alternatives and careful scrutiny of the available 
information.”). 
 137. See Charles R. Schwenk, Effects of Devil’s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry on Decision 
Making: A Meta-Analysis, 47 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 161, 170–71 
(1990) (concluding that the devil’s advocate is more effective in improving decision quality than simply 
obtaining advice from an expert or consultant). 
 138. See Nemeth et al., supra note 135, at 55 (concluding that “authentic-minority dissent is more 
effective in stimulating unbiased thinking, consideration of both sides of an issue, as well as original 
independent thought, relative to a devil’s advocate” but noting that the devil’s advocate was better than 
nothing); Charlan Nemeth, Keith Brown & John Rogers, Devil’s Advocate Versus Authentic Dissent: 
Stimulating Quantity and Quality, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 707, 716 (2001) (concluding that an 
authentic dissenting minority is superior to a devil’s advocate). 
 139. See Kathy A. Bryan, Why Should Businesses Hire Settlement Counsel?, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 
195, 202 (“Corporate counsel should take the lead and experiment with using separate settlement 
counsel . . . .”); Coyne, supra note 16, at 412–13 (advocating that clients hire separate “settlement 
counsel,” rather than rely upon litigation counsel to settle cases); John Lande, The Movement Toward 
Early Case Handling in Courts and Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OH. ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 112–13 
(2008) (“Settlement counsel often operate in parallel with litigation counsel, who focus exclusively on 
litigation and do not negotiate the case.”) (footnote omitted); James E. McGuire, Why Litigators Should 
Use Settlement Counsel, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., June 2000, at 1, 120 (explaining how 
settlement counsel can help resolve disputes). 
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4.  Nonconsequentialist Reasoning 
The fundamental question looming over the fact-gathering phase of 
every lawsuit—which includes private informal investigation, mandatory 
disclosure, and formal discovery—is how much information should be 
sought?140 Litigants and lawyers must decide how to prioritize and 
sequence the acquisition of information, and when the accumulation of 
information should cease. Unless a litigant is proceeding pro se, these 
choices are made by lawyers with minimal client supervision141 and with 
minimal interference from the courts. Cost-effective litigation thus requires 
that lawyers avoid collecting information that they simply do not need. 
Collecting unnecessary information is perhaps an understandable 
impulse. Pursuing a line of inquiry, even when it can have no effect on 
judgment, can seem like the responsible course in the face of 
uncertainty.142 Most people also “tend to assume that more information 
cannot hurt.”143 Determining when to stop collecting information, however, 
is a challenging task that requires balancing “information costs, amount of 
payoff, time pressure, complexity, importance, experience, and the level of 
confidence.”144 The information that people actually need might not be the 
same as what they may feel that they need. People’s judgments about when 
to stop acquiring information are biased toward acquiring too much 
information in two ways: “underattention to the probability that actions 
will differ for different possible answers,” and “overattention to the 
probability of ruling some hypothesis in, or out, with certainty.”145 In 
effect, people adopt the heuristic that more information must be better, 
without regard for the cost of that information or the need for it.146 
 
 140. Pearse v. Pearse, (1846) 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (Ch.) (“Truth, like all other good things, may 
be loved unwisely—may be pursued too keenly—may cost too much.”). 
 141. See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 
1915 (1993) (“[A]ll major classes of civil litigants seem to view evidence gathering, together with 
defensive tactics to fight opponents’ evidence gathering, as primarily the job of lawyers.”). 
 142. See Anthony Bastardi & Eldar Shafir, Nonconsequential Reasoning and Its Consequences, 9 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 216, 219 (2000) (noting that people “may be led to pursue 
noninstrumental information out of a desire to be thorough, or to appear responsible”). 
 143. Donald A. Redelmeier, Eldar Shafir & Prince S. Aujla, The Beguiling Pursuit of More 
Information, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 374, 377 (2001). 
 144. See Daniel Hausmann & Damian Läge, Sequential Evidence Accumulation in Decision 
Making: The Individual Desired Level of Confidence Can Explain the Extent of Information 
Acquisition, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 229, 239 (2008). 
 145. Jonathan Baron, Jane Beattie & John C. Hershey, Heuristics and Biases in Diagnostic 
Reasoning: II Congruence, Information, and Certainty, 42 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
88, 90 (1988). 
 146. Id. at 109 (noting that many people fail “to carry out different kinds of ‘checks’ on an initial 
decision to ask a question”). 
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Psychologists have demonstrated that numerous cognitive processes 
can promote the tendency to seek out too much information, but they 
mostly arise from a failure to think through the implications that the 
information might hold for decisionmaking—so called nonconsequentialist 
reasoning.147 This failure is most evident in a phenomenon called the 
“disjunction effect.”148 The disjunction effect occurs “when people prefer x 
over y when they know that event A obtains, and they also prefer x over y 
when they know that event A does not obtain, but they prefer y over x when 
it is unknown whether or not A obtains.”149 In one study demonstrating the 
effect, psychologists Amos Tversky and Eldar Shafir asked undergraduates 
a question as to whether they would want to purchase a hypothetical highly 
attractive, nonrefundable vacation to Hawaii after an important qualifying 
exam.150 A majority of students who were told that they had passed the 
exam indicated that they would purchase the vacation, as did a majority of 
students who were told that they had failed the exam. The vast majority of 
a third group told that they did not yet know the results, however, indicated 
that they would prefer to wait until they learned the outcome of the exam 
before making their decision.151 Tversky and Shafir argued that when the 
subjects knew the outcome of the exam, the vacation would be perceived as 
either a celebration for passing the exam or a consolation for failing the 
exam.152 When the outcome was unknown, however, the subjects lacked a 
clear rationale for taking the trip.153 If the subjects facing uncertainty had 
thought through how they would feel in both cases, they would have 
recognized that they would have wanted to take the trip either way. Instead, 
they simply waited for the unnecessary information. 
Lawyers commonly are inclined to seek and obtain information first 
and assess its usefulness later.154 As we discussed in the context of the 
confirmation bias above, the fact that lawyers do not bear the costs of their 
decisions might exacerbate this tendency. Litigators thus suffer from a 
 
 147. See Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential 
Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449, 449 (1992) (“When thinking under uncertainty, 
people often do not consider appropriately each of the relevant branches of a decision tree, as required 
by consequentialism.”). For a description of nonconsequentialist reasoning, see id. at 451. 
 148. Id. at 451. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under Uncertainty, 3 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 305, 305–06 (1992). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 306. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 69 (“Thus, information is generally acquired first and 
evaluated later . . . .”). 
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double distortion: they overvalue the additional information and then 
undervalue the costs incurred by the responding party in providing the 
information. Lawyers also likely do not realize that the additional 
information might hinder or distort their own judgment. 
How can an excess of information distort judgment? A large volume 
of information can interfere with the processing of useful information,155 
but information that is irrelevant can also distort choice. Having chosen to 
seek out information, people seem to feel a need to rely upon it as well.156 
In one demonstration of this effect, researchers asked dialysis nurses 
whether they would (hypothetically) be willing to donate a kidney to a 
sixty-eight-year-old relative.157 When the researchers informed half of the 
nurses that they were a match for the transplant, 44 percent agreed that they 
would be willing to donate a kidney.158 Presumably, if they had not known 
whether they matched the relative, only 44 percent would have been 
willing to be tested for compatibility, as the remaining nurses were 
unwilling to donate. Nevertheless, when researchers told the other half of 
the nurses that it was uncertain whether or not they were compatible, 69 
percent agreed to undergo further testing to determine whether they 
matched.159 A subset of these nurses thus pursued information that should 
have been irrelevant to their choice. The researchers demonstrated, 
however, that deciding to pursue the information affected the nurses’ 
choices. They informed all of the nurses who agreed to be tested to suppose 
that they matched and then asked whether they would donate. Nearly all 
(93 percent) agreed to donate,160 even though they were put in exactly the 
same position as those nurses who were initially told that they were 
compatible. Overall, 65 percent of the nurses who were put through a two-
stage decisionmaking process in which they could seek information that 
was largely irrelevant chose to donate, as opposed to 44 percent in the 
simple version who were told of their compatibility immediately.161 This 
 
 155. See Scott S. Wiltermoth & Margaret A. Neale, Too Much Information: The Perils of Non-
Diagnostic Information in Negotiations, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 192, 199 (2011) (“In our studies, 
possessing NDI [nondiagnostic information] about a counterpart impaired negotiator effectiveness in 
both face-to-face and electronically mediated negotiations.”). 
 156. See Anthony Bastardi & Eldar Shafir, On the Pursuit and Misuse of Useless Information, 75 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 19 (1998) (“Decision makers often pursue noninstrumental 
information—information that appears relevant but, if simply available, would have no impact on 
choice. Once they pursue such information, people then use it to make their decision.”). 
 157. Redelmeier, Shafir & Aujla, supra note 143, at 376. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. The 35 percent who chose not to donate include the combination of those who refused to 
be tested and those who tested positive and then refused to donate. 
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study, which has been replicated with similar materials,162 demonstrates 
that people both needlessly pursue irrelevant information and then—despite 
its irrelevance—rely on such information once they obtain it. 
Waiting to obtain missing information causes people to evaluate the 
information they receive differently and increases its impact on 
judgment.163 As two researchers put it, “Waiting Increases Weighting.”164 
To determine whether lawyers also pursue, and rely on, unneeded 
information, we presented a scenario to the Oregon and the Texas lawyers. 
They were asked to assume that they were representing a plaintiff who had 
suffered severe facial scarring after a welding machine exploded.165 The 
cause of the accident, they learned, was either a defect in the defendant’s 
machine or the plaintiff’s misuse of the machine. The materials indicated 
that the defendant had offered to pay $400,000 to settle the case. The 
materials also stated that the plaintiff “feels that this offer feels low because 
his injuries have caused him severe embarrassment and depression,” but 
added that “he might be willing to accept the offer because he is also 
anxious to get past the lawsuit.” 
The participants read one of two versions of the materials. In the 
simple version, the materials indicated that a government safety report had 
implicated the defendant’s machine. The simple version then asks the 
lawyers whether they would advise their client to accept the settlement or 
reject it and proceed to trial. In the complex version, the materials indicated 
that a government safety report was due out any day but was not yet 
available. The complex version then asked the lawyers to choose one of the 
following: (1) recommend that the plaintiff accept the settlement offer 
immediately; (2) recommend that the plaintiff reject the settlement offer 
and proceed to trial; or (3) recommend that the plaintiff wait until after the 
government safety report was available to decide whether to accept or 
reject the settlement. The materials stated that the offer would remain open 
and unchanged regardless of what the report ultimately stated. The next 
page of the materials then asked those participants who had advised the 
plaintiff to wait to continue reading. Eventually, the materials revealed that 
 
 162. Id. at 376–77 (replicating similar results with different materials and practicing urologists 
and academic physicians). See generally Bastardi & Shafir, supra note 156 (reporting several similar 
studies conducted with undergraduate subjects). 
 163. See Bastardi & Shafir, supra note 156, at 28 (“Waiting for information that appears relevant 
to a decision can raise the extent to which it is brought before one’s attention and thus increase its 
influence on choice.”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See infra Appendix III. 
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the government safety report implicated the defendant’s machine. The 
lawyers in the complex condition were then asked whether they would 
recommend that their client now accept or reject the settlement offer. 
The format of our materials thus presents the possibility of waiting for 
irrelevant material. Participants who agree to settle are analogous to those 
nurses who refused to donate, because the government report is not truly 
relevant to them. Lawyers who settle in the face of a favorable report 
would almost certainly do so if the report was negative, so, the report is not 
an important piece of information for them. Those who wait for the report 
ultimately end up in the same position as those lawyers in the simple 
condition who were told that the report was favorable. Therefore, those 
who wait should make the same decision as those who did not wait. 
Table 5, below, presents the results. A majority of the lawyers, 65.6 
percent (forty-two out of sixty-four), evaluating the simple version favored 
settling. In contrast, only 43.8 percent (thirty-five out of eighty) of the 
lawyers evaluating the complex version recommended settlement. The 
difference between the settlement rate in the simple version and the initial 
settlement rate in the complex version was statistically significant.166 The 
lure of waiting for more information thus influenced the lawyers’ 
assessments of whether to settle. 
 
 
 
 
 166. Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .01 
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TABLE 5.  Number (and Percentage) of Lawyers Making Each Choice in 
the Simple and Complex Versions of the Products Liability Problem 
 
Version 
 
Choice 
Timing 
Immediate After Waiting
a
 Total 
Simple 
Settle 42 (65.6%) … 42 (65.5%) 
Litigate 22 (34.4%) … 22 (34.4%) 
Complex 
Settle 35 (43.8%) 8 (10.0%) 43 (53.8%) 
Litigate 7 (8.8%) 30 (37.5%) 37 (46.3%) 
aDespite instructions to the contrary, six of the seven lawyers who indicated that they would 
recommend rejecting the settlement and also responded to the page revealing the outcome of the report. 
Of these six, five indicated they would still decline to settle and one changed her mind and endorsed 
settlement. Also, one of the lawyers who indicated that they would settle changed her mind after 
reading that the report was favorable. We ignored these additional responses because these subjects 
failed to follow the instructions. Even if we had included these decisions as the as the final choices, 
however, the same number of lawyers would ultimately have endorsed settlement because one lawyer 
who initially indicated that she would litigate ultimately chose to settle, and one lawyer who initially 
indicated that she would settle ultimately chose to litigate. 
 The reaction to the uncertainty the missing report created seemed 
especially pronounced among those lawyers who did not fare well on the 
CRT. Among the lawyers who answered none of the CRT questions 
correctly, 88.9 percent (eight out of nine) of those reviewing the simple 
version recommended settlement, as compared to only 16.7 percent (one 
out of six) of those reviewing the complex version. This gap was much 
smaller among those who got at least one CRT question correct: 62.7 
percent (twenty-seven out of forty-three) of those reviewing the simple 
condition agreed to settle, as compared to only 43.5 percent (twenty-seven 
out of sixty-two) of those reviewing the complex version. This trend was 
not statistically significant, however.167 
Male and female lawyers reacted differently to the materials. Among 
the male lawyers, 64.4 percent (twenty-nine out of forty-five) of those 
reviewing the simple version settled, as compared to the 55.3 percent 
(twenty-six out of forty-seven) of those reviewing the complex version. 
 
 167. This was assessed by running a logistic regression of the decision to settle or not (combining 
those lawyers in the complex version who chose to litigate and chose to wait into one group) on the 
condition, the CRT score (treated as a continuous measure), and an interaction term for CRT by 
condition. Neither the term for the CRT score nor the interaction term produced significant coefficients 
in the regression (z = 0.67, p = .50 for the main effect of experience; z = 0.67, p = .51 for the 
interaction). The sample size was small, making it hard to detect any effects. 
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This difference was far more pronounced among the female lawyers, 
however, as 72.2 percent (thirteen out of eighteen) of those reviewing the 
simple condition settled, as compared to 26.9 percent (seven out of twenty-
six) of those reviewing the complex version. The interaction of gender with 
the condition (version) was statistically significant.168 Experience and 
political orientation, on the other hand, did not affect the lawyers’ decisions 
to settle significantly.169 
Having obtained additional information, the lawyers seemed to want 
to make use of it. The settlement rate for those lawyers who waited to learn 
the contents of the report was quite low, as only 21.1 percent (eight out of 
thirty-eight) settled. This was a statistically significant difference from the 
settlement rate among lawyers who reviewed the simple version (65.6 
percent, as noted above).170 Having waited and gotten good news about the 
quality of their case, these lawyers wanted to go to trial—even though they 
were put in exactly the same position as their colleagues in the simple 
version. 
Overall, lawyers reviewing the complex version were less likely to 
settle than lawyers reviewing the simple version: 53.8 percent (forty-three 
out of eighty) settled, as compared to 65.6 percent (forty-two out of sixty-
four). Although the overall differences in settlement rates suggest that 
many of the lawyers not only waited for information that they did not need, 
but also were then affected by that information, the difference in settlement 
rates was not statistically significant.171 
 
 168. This was assessed by running a logistic regression of the decision to settle or not (combining 
those lawyers in the complex version who chose to litigate and chose to wait into one group) on the 
condition, gender, and an interaction term for condition by gender. The main effect of gender was not 
significant (z = 0.59, p =.56), suggesting that men and women settled at comparable rates, but the 
interaction term was significant (z = 1.94, p =.05). 
 169. This was assessed by running a logistic regression of the decision to settle or not (combining 
those lawyers in the complex version who chose to litigate and chose to wait into one group) on the 
condition, the years of experience (or party), and an interaction term or experience by condition (or 
party). Neither experience nor the interaction term produced significant coefficients in the regression (z 
= 0.73, p = .47 for the main effect of experience; z = 1.01, p = .31 for the interaction). Likewise, neither 
party nor the interaction term produced significant coefficients in the regression (z = 0.41, p = .68 for 
the main effect of experience; z = 0.07, p = .94 for the interaction). 
 170. Fisher’s Exact Test, p < .001. 
 171. Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .17. Just as with the decision as to whether to settle or wait, the 
ultimate decision as to whether to settle seemed to be influenced by the CRT score. Among the lawyers 
who answered none of the CRT questions correctly, 88.9 percent (eight out of nine) reviewing the 
simple condition agreed to settle (as noted above), whereas only 16.7 percent (one out of six) reviewing 
the complex version ultimately settled (all five of the lawyers who agreed to wait and scored at least 
one correct on the CRT chose to litigate). This gap was much smaller among those who got at least one 
CRT question correct: 62.7 percent (twenty-seven out of forty-three) of those reviewing the simple 
version in the simple condition (as noted above), whereas only 52.9 percent (thirty-six out of sixty-
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Given the lack of an overall main effect on settlement rates, we report 
the influence of the demographic variables only for completeness. Neither 
the main effect of the CRT score nor the interaction of CRT score with 
condition were significant.172 Neither the main effect of gender nor the 
interaction of gender with the condition was statistically significant.173 In 
addition, experience and political orientation did not affect the lawyers’ 
decisions to settle significantly.174 
These results demonstrate that, like most people, lawyers sometimes 
pursue useless information. For most of the lawyers, the government safety 
report could not provide useful information. Even armed with a favorable 
report that would support rejecting the low settlement offer and going to 
trial, two-thirds of the lawyers evaluating the simple version thought that 
the settlement was worth accepting. If the report had been negative, then 
the plaintiff’s odds of success would have been lower, and the defendant’s 
settlement offer would have seemed more attractive. Therefore, at least the 
same percentage of lawyers reviewing the complex version should have 
settled. And yet, only a minority did so. Lawyers, it seems, have the 
instinct to wait for information that seems relevant without thinking 
through whether they are waiting for information that would actually be 
valuable. 
Furthermore, the lawyers also seemed compelled to rely on the 
information that they had needlessly pursued. The lawyers who waited for 
the government safety report all eventually confronted the same facts as the 
lawyers who were merely told that the report was favorable. But the 
lawyers who waited for the information essentially all chose to litigate, 
while those who did not have a chance to wait for the information largely 
settled. To be sure, offering lawyers a chance to wait might have facilitated 
 
eight) of those reviewing the complex version settled. In an analysis that controlled for the effect of the 
CRT score, the condition (version) had a significant effect. In the logistic regression of the overall 
decision to settle or not on the condition, the CRT score (treated as a continuous measure), and an 
interaction term for CRT by condition, the main effect of condition in this analysis was marginally 
significant (z = 1.90, p = .06).  
  The materials had different effects on the ultimate settlement decisions of the male and 
female lawyers. The male lawyers seemed largely unaffected by the condition: 64.4 percent (twenty-
nine out of forty-five) reviewing the simple version settled, as compared to 61.7 percent (twenty-nine 
out of forty-seven) of those reviewing the complex version. This difference was far more pronounced 
among the female lawyers, however, as 72.2 percent (thirteen out of eighteen) reviewing the simple 
version settled, as compared to 46.2 percent (twelve out of twenty-six) of those reviewing the complex 
version.  
 172. z = 0.67, p = .50 for the main effect of experience; z = 1.27, p = .20 for the interaction. 
 173. z = 0.59, p =.56 for the main effect of gender, z = 1.26, p = .21 for the interaction term. 
 174. z = 0.73, p = .47 for the main effect of experience; z = 0.40, p = .69 for the interaction; z = 
0.41, p = .68 for the main effect of party affiliation; z = 0.19, p = .85 for the interaction. 
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some self-selection, so that the group who waited might have been more 
litigious than the lawyers who evaluated the simple version. But the data 
suggest a trend towards greater litigation rates among lawyers who were 
given the option of waiting for information. 
Like the other phenomena explored in this Article, 
nonconsequentialist reasoning can promote excessive litigation. 
Nonconsequentialist reasoning has a double effect on litigation rates. Like 
the confirmation bias, it can lead litigants to engage in excessive discovery. 
Perhaps worse, it can encourage parties to treat any favorable evidence that 
they encounter as justification for further litigation. 
The pursuit of and reliance on useless information documented in this 
study and others results from people’s inability or unwillingness to count 
out all possible ramifications of potential future information before 
obtaining it.175 Intuitively, it seems better to have more information, even 
though thorough analysis would reveal that the information is not necessary 
to make a sound decision. To overcome this tendency, lawyers should 
“consider the relevance of missing information before it is pursued.”176 
Additionally, they might precommit themselves to a particular course of 
action depending on what they expect the missing information to reveal. 
For example, before taking a deposition, lawyers should outline what 
action they will take if the deponent’s testimony is favorable, unfavorable, 
or equivocal. That would encourage them to assess its relevance ahead of 
time, which might cause them to forgo the deposition, and also might 
enable them to avoid giving the missing information undue emphasis when 
it eventually becomes available.177 Finally, they might ask a colleague for a 
recommendation once all the information is available, so that they can 
benefit from “a fresh perspective that is free of the investments made 
during a difficult or long search” and the resulting delay.178 
5.  Sunk-Cost Fallacy 
“There’s no use crying over spilled milk.”179 Giving that advice, 
 
 175. See Eldar Shafir, Uncertainty and the Difficulty of Thinking Through Disjunctions, 50 
COGNITION 403, 404–05, 425–27 (1994) (arguing that people are naturally disinclined to perform the 
mentally taxing task of thinking through disjunction). 
 176. See Redelmeier, Shafir & Aujla, supra note 143, at 378. Although Redelmeier, Shafir & 
Aujla’s paper discusses physicians’ decisionmaking, we believe the same analysis is relevant to 
lawyers’ decisionmaking. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (“Colleagues who are presented with all the data at one time often see things differently 
than the physician who obtains the same data through gradual struggle.”). 
 179. A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROVERBS 129 (Wolfgang Meider et al. eds., 1992).  
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however, seems easier than following it.180 People “often incur further 
losses (‘throw good money after bad’) or take great risks in order to recover 
those losses.”181 They tend “to continue an endeavor once an investment in 
money, effort, or time has been made,”182 even if they would be better off 
abandoning it from an objective point of view. Further, the greater the 
investment, the stronger is the inclination to continue.183 This tendency, 
which is often called the “sunk-cost fallacy,”184 “can lead to sub-optimal 
economic decisions, because such decisions should be based solely on 
future costs and benefits, not ones which have already occurred.”185 Most 
economists agree that considering sunk costs when making decisions is a 
mistake because “[a] prior investment should not influence one’s 
consideration of current options; only the incremental costs and benefits of 
the current options should influence one’s decisions.”186 As Richard Posner 
explained, “Rational people base their decisions on their expectations of the 
future rather than on their regrets about the past. They treat bygones as 
bygones.”187 
The sunk-cost fallacy has been widely studied. In a striking 
experiment, researchers gave a group of participants the following 
problem: 
As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10 million 
dollars of the company’s money into a research project. The purpose was 
to build a plane that would not be detected by conventional radar, in 
 
 180. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 
100 YALE L.J. 73, 113 (1990) (“Although economists exhort decision-makers to ignore sunk costs and 
to attend only to the prospective benefits and costs of alternative courses of action, few attain this 
ideal.”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124 (1985). 
 183. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 37 (1988) (“[T]he larger the past resource investment in a decision, the greater 
the inclination to continue the commitment in subsequent decisions.”) (footnote omitted). 
 184. See Hal R. Arkes & Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less 
Rational Than Lower Animal?, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 597 (1999) (“The sunk cost fallacy is 
due to the inability to segregate prior losses from the current decision as to whether the incremental 
benefits outweigh the incremental costs.”). 
 185. Hal R. Arkes & Laura Hutzel, The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the Sunk Cost 
Effect, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 295, 295 (2000). 
 186. Arkes & Ayton, supra note 184, at 591. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 
305 (4th ed. 2008) (“Once you have determined that the best course of action for the future is to change 
plans—having weighed the effect on others and all of the relevant factors—the time, effort, and money 
you have spent in the past does not matter one bit.”); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 95 (3d ed. 1988) (“Sunk costs are like spilt milk: They are past 
and irreversible outflows.”). 
 187. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8 (4th ed. 1992). 
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other words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 90% completed, 
another firm begins marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. 
Also, it is apparent that their plane is much faster and far more 
economical than the plane your company is building. The question is: 
should you invest the last 10% of the research funds to finish your radar-
blank plane?188 
They divided their subjects into two groups. Of those responding to the 
version of the problem quoted above, 85 percent recommended completing 
the project,189 even though, as the problem explained, the plane would be 
inferior to another plane already on the market. They gave a second group a 
version of the problem that was similar, except that there was no reference 
to the prior investment of ten million dollars. Of the participants in the 
second group, only 17 percent recommended spending more money on the 
project.190 
The sunk-cost fallacy is not confined to the laboratory. Real-world 
examples abound.191 In a speech to veterans two years into the war in Iraq, 
President George W. Bush justified his administration’s decision to carry 
on with the war by reference to the soldiers already lost, arguing that “[w]e 
owe them something” and asserting that “[w]e will finish the task that they 
gave their lives for.”192 The lives lost in the war at that point could not be 
regained, regardless of the course the administration pursued thereafter, but 
their loss seemed to influence policy nonetheless. 
In a different context, professional basketball teams also express a 
 
 188. Arkes & Blumer, supra note 182, at 129. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. 
 191. See Brian H. Bornstein & Gretchen B. Chapman, Learning Lessons from Sunk Costs, 1 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 251, 251 (1995) (noting that sunk costs influence choice in diverse 
situations including “personal decisions, financial decisions in business, evaluation of employees’ 
performance, and competitive behavior”) (citations omitted); Tobias Greitemeyer, Stefan Schulz-Hardt 
& Dieter Frey, The Effects of Authentic and Contrived Dissent on Escalation of Commitment in Group 
Decision Making, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 644 (2009) (“The reluctance to quit failing courses of 
action is a widespread phenomenon.”). Some have argued that the many supposed examples of the 
sunk-cost fallacy are actually situations in which attending to the loss is a reasonable strategy because 
the loss is informative in some way. See Thomas Kelly, Sunk Costs, Rationality and Acting for the Sake 
of the Past, 38 NOȖS 60, 68 (2004) (arguing that in some circumstances, “the pure honorer of sunk costs 
fares better than the pure expected utility maximizer”); R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. 
Mialon, Do Sunk Costs Matter?, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 323, 334 (2010) (concluding that ignoring sunk 
costs is rational in situations in which “past investments are not informative, reputation concerns are 
unimportant, and budget constraints are not salient”). 
 192. Quoted in Barry Schwartz, The Sunk Cost Fallacy: Bush Falls Victim to a Bad Argument for 
the Iraq War, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2005, 6:24 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
hey_wait_a_minute/2005/09/the_sunkcost_fallacy.html. 
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sunk-cost fallacy by playing high draft choices more than low draft 
choices, even when the latter outperform the former.193 Measuring the level 
of teams’ investment by the order in which players were selected in the 
college draft, with an earlier pick representing a larger investment by the 
team than a later pick, researchers studied whether players’ playing time 
and longevity would be determined by their performance on the court, or 
alternatively, by the level of the team’s investment in them. They found 
that players in whom teams had a greater investment received more playing 
time and enjoyed longer retention rates than other players, even after 
controlling for the players’ performance, injuries, trade status, and position 
played. 
The sunk-cost fallacy has both motivational and cognitive causes. 
Having incurred sizeable costs in pursuit of some endeavor, people want to 
believe that the undertaking will ultimately succeed. A desire to avoid 
cognitive dissonance induces them to believe that that they have 
undertaken the right course of action,194 and people like to be consistent in 
their support for an undertaking195 and follow through with 
commitments.196 Sunk costs associated with an undertaking also frame the 
decision in terms of whether to spend further resources on an 
undertaking.197 In effect, people might take some extra risk in hopes of 
achieving spectacular, but low probability, gain that allows them to avoid 
locking in a sure loss.198 Finally, people might overgeneralize a simple rule 
that it is wrong to waste resources.199 
 
 193. Barry M. Staw & Ha Hoang, Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time 
and Survival in Professional Basketball, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 474, 474 (1995). See generally Colin F. 
Camerer & Roberto A. Weber, The Econometrics and Behavioral Economics of Escalation of 
Commitment: A Re-Examination of Staw and Hoang’s NBA Data, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 59 
(1999) (discussing and analyzing Staw and Hoang’s data). 
 194. See Arkes & Hutzel, supra note 185, at 304 (suggesting cognitive dissonance and impression 
management as two potential causes of the sunk-cost fallacy); Daniel Friedman et al., Searching for the 
Sunk Cost Fallacy, 10 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 79, 83 (2007) (“Self-justification (or cognitive 
dissonance) induces people who have sunk resources into an unprofitable activity to irrationally revise 
their beliefs about the profitability of an additional investment, in order to avoid the unpleasant 
acknowledgement that they made a mistake and wasted the sunk resources.”). 
 195. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 52–97 (4th ed. 2001). 
 196. Id. at 61–97. 
 197. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 183, at 37 (“The greater the investment in the 
status quo alternative, the more strongly it will be retained.”). 
 198. See Friedman et al, supra note 194, at 83 (“[L]oss aversion (with respect to a reference point 
fixed before the costs were sunk) might induce people to choose an additional investment whose 
incremental return has negative expected value but still has some chance of allowing a positive return 
on the overall investment.”). 
 199. See Arkes & Ayton, supra note 184, at 595 (“[A] major contributor to the sunk cost effect is 
people’s desire not to appear to be wasteful.”). 
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The sunk-cost fallacy illustrates another difficulty that collecting an 
excessive amount of information in discovery might pose for lawyers and 
their clients. Acquiring and analyzing information requires investment. In 
most lawsuits in the United States, attorney’s fees incurred in litigation is a 
sunk cost that cannot be recovered, even if a litigant ultimately prevails.200 
This feature of litigation in the United States means that the attorney’s fees 
create a sunk cost for most litigants.201 Having spent large sums on 
litigation, lawyers and their clients might be reluctant to settle.202 
To determine whether sunk costs influence lawyers’ litigation-related 
decisions, we presented settlement decision materials to the insurance 
lawyers.203 We asked the lawyers to assume that they were representing the 
plaintiff in a breach-of-contract case. The materials indicated that the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had delivered defective machines used 
in fabricating semiconductors; that discovery had closed; that the plaintiff’s 
maximum possible recovery was $1,000,000; and that the contract did not 
contain a provision authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party. The plaintiff had suffered an unacceptably high defect rate 
relative to industry norms, but the evidence regarding the cause of the 
defect conflicted. The material gave the plaintiff’s likelihood of succeeding 
at trial as 50 percent. Further, the additional nontaxable costs and attorney’s 
fees that the plaintiff would incur by litigating the case through trial would 
be $70,000. The materials then stated that the defendant had offered to 
settle the case for $480,000, an amount that should have been attractive 
because it exceeded the expected value of proceeding to trial by $50,000.204 
 
 200. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). In the United 
States, hundreds of fee-shifting statutes and rules create fee shifting of one kind or another, but the 
backdrop is always a rule that each party pays their own expenses. See ALAN J. TOMKINS & THOMAS E. 
WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES: PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 49 (1986) (asserting that each side usually pays their own expenses in litigation in the United 
States, although exceptions abound). 
 201. See David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 225, 232 n.18 (1994) (“Attorney fees already incurred represent sunk costs that should have no 
bearing on the settlement decision . . . .”). The use of contingency-fee arrangements complicates matters 
because the lawyer has incurred the costs. See Miller, supra note 30, at 189–90 (explaining how counsel 
representing plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis become “partial owners” of the plaintiff’s claim). 
 202. See Jay Folberg, Joshua Rosenberg & Robert Barrett, Use of ADR in California Courts: 
Findings and Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 343, 369 (1992) (“[A]s a case progress [sic], ‘sunk costs’ 
and emotional preparation for trial make settlement more difficult.”); Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra 
note 180, at 113–14 (stating that the sunk-cost fallacy can hinder settlement after the parties have 
invested in litigation). 
 203. See infra, Appendix IV. 
 204. The expected recovery of $1,000,000, reduced to $500,000 to take into account the 50 
percent chance of success, and further reduced by $70,000 in prospective attorney’s fees, yields an 
expected value of trial for the plaintiff of $430,000. 
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Subjects were given one of two versions of the scenario: half were told that 
they had already spent $90,000 in attorney’s fees litigating the case, and the 
other half were told that they had already spent $420,000 in attorney’s fees 
litigating the case. If lawyers are not susceptible to the sunk-cost fallacy, 
then the settlement proposal should have been equally appealing to both 
groups. 
Our results, however, revealed a substantial difference between the 
groups. Among lawyers who learned that they had already spent $90,000, 
76 percent (forty-one out of fifty-four) recommended that the settlement 
proposal be accepted, as contrasted with only 45 percent (twenty-four out 
of fifty-three) of those lawyers who learned that they had already spent 
$420,000. This difference was significant, statistically.205 We observed no 
statistically significant differences among the lawyers by gender, CRT 
score, years in practice, or litigator versus nonlitigator.206 
These results clearly demonstrate the influence of sunk costs on 
lawyers’ decisions. The money that had already been spent on litigation 
could not be recovered, and yet it influenced the lawyers’ assessments of 
the case. Instead of assessing the settlement offer with respect to the future 
expected outcomes alone, the lawyers assessed it relative to past events that 
could not be undone. 
This experiment displays the power of the sunk-cost fallacy. The 
lawyers did not need to invest the sunk costs personally in order to be 
vulnerable to its influence. The lawyers who were simply told that they 
were representing someone else who had previously made a nonrecoupable 
investment were affected. The lawyers might have identified with the 
client’s position and adopted the same perspective of the case that would 
produce the sunk-cost fallacy in the clients themselves.207  
Alternatively, the lawyers’ recommendations in this problem might 
have reflected more of an anticipation of how their client would react, as 
opposed to feeling the influence of the sunk costs personally. The lawyers 
facing $420,000 in sunk costs might have worried that their clients would 
blame them for the highly unfavorable total outcome (a net gain of only 
 
 205. Fisher’s Exact Test, p <.005. 
 206. We observed a nonsignificant trend toward more experienced lawyers to show a less 
pronounced effect, z = 1.36, p = .17, and a marginally significant trend for more experienced lawyers to 
favor settlement more, z = 1.72, p =.09. 
 207. See Brian G. Gunia, Niro Sivanathan & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Entrapment: Your 
Sunk Costs, My Escalation of Commitment, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1238, 1243 (2009) ( 
“Participants escalated whenever they experienced a psychological connection to the earlier decision-
maker . . . .”).  
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$60,000 on a million dollar claim) that the settlement would have 
produced. Hence, the lawyers’ recommendations in this condition might 
have reflected their concern that they bore some responsibility for the level 
of prior investment.208 The lawyers might have felt that the possibility of 
losing at trial was more appealing than having to explain to the client how 
they spent so much of the client’s money in an unproductive cause. 
Regardless of which explanation is correct, the level of sunk costs 
influenced the lawyers’ judgment. 
In some situations, appearing to honor sunk costs in evaluating a 
settlement proposal would not be erroneous, but our scenario is not one of 
them. Efforts to create or protect a reputation for commitment209 or a 
reputation for ability210 are potentially good reasons for continuing a course 
of action despite mounting costs. In our scenario, however, the lawyers 
who accepted the settlement offer were not abandoning a losing endeavor 
prematurely. Rather, they were accepting a deal that exceeded the present 
expected value of the case. Persisting with litigation under these 
circumstances marks them as irrational rather than steadfast. Similarly, 
nothing in our scenario suggests that the degree of completion is correlated 
with eventual success. Nor does our experiment suggest a repeat-player 
situation in which, to discourage future litigation, a litigant might behave 
“irrationally” in the short run in order to create maximum incentives for its 
adversary to adopt the long-run behavior which the litigant desires. 
If the lawyers’ advice was colored by their self-interest in avoiding 
blame for overinvesting in the case,211 they may have avoided cognitive 
 
 208. See Arkes & Ayton, supra note 184, at 597 (“[I]t has been shown a number of times that if 
the decision maker bears personal responsibility for an initial investment, that person is more likely to 
‘throw good money after bad’ compared with the situation in which the decision maker bears no 
responsibility for the initial investment decision.”) (citations omitted); Staw & Hoang, supra note 193, 
at 474 (“[P]eople responsible for a losing course of action will invest further than those not responsible 
for prior losses.”). 
 209. See McAfee, Mialon & Mialon, supra note 191, at 328 (“Refusing to abandon projects with 
large sunk costs might be rational because it creates a reputation for commitment.”). 
 210. See id. at 330 (“Abandoning a project may also reveal an agent as a poor forecaster, leading 
agents to rationally persist with unprofitable projects to conceal their poor skills.”). 
 211. There are two senses in which maintaining reputation might promote the sunk-cost fallacy: 
internal (protecting one’s view of oneself) and external (protecting others’ views of oneself). See Joyce 
E. Berg, John W. Dickhaut & Chandra Kanodia, The Role of Information Asymmetry in Escalation 
Phenomena: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 135 (2009); Fredrick V. Fox & 
Barry M. Staw, The Trapped Administrator: Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance upon 
Commitment to a Course of Action, 24 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 449, 453 (1979) (“When faced with an external 
threat or evaluation, individuals may be motivated to prove to others that they were not wrong in an 
earlier decision and the force of such external justification could well be stronger than the protection of 
individual self-esteem.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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error but failed their client in a different way, specifically, by placing their 
client’s interest in whether to settle beneath their own selfish interest in 
avoiding blame for their choices that led to the excessive sunk costs. In 
either case, then, the existence of large sunk costs caused lawyers to advise 
their client against accepting an attractive settlement offer. In effect, our 
result might reflect a combination of the sunk-cost fallacy with the agency 
costs associated with the structure of the attorney-client relationship. 
Whether the lawyers’ reason was the sunk costs themselves, or a fear of 
being blamed for having unwisely incurred them, does not really matter. In 
either event, the existence of sunk costs triggered rejection of a settlement 
that probably should have been accepted, thereby prolonging the case and 
multiplying the resources invested in it. 
The sunk-cost fallacy, if widespread in litigation, obviously has an 
untoward effect on the settlement process. Notably, the same settlement 
offer made at different times (and after varying investments of sunk costs) 
can result in different recommendations by attorneys. This suggests that 
serious consideration of settlement should occur sooner rather than later, 
and that large investments of nonrecoupable costs should be deferred until 
the possibility of settlement has been thoroughly explored. This makes 
mandatory prediscovery disclosures of essential information—preferably 
both favorable and unfavorable—highly advisable.212 It also suggests that 
discovery should be staged thoughtfully in order to control the timing of 
discovery costs, with the most important and most accessible discovery 
occurring first, followed by settlement negotiations, and only if those 
negotiations fail should less important and less accessible discovery be 
permitted. 
The sunk-cost fallacy might also interfere with lawyers’ ability to 
make sound decisions about discovery. As an example, it might induce 
them to continue pursuing discovery long after it is clear to an objective, 
disinterested observer that further discovery is unlikely to yield helpful 
information. Commitment to a case likely escalates in direct relation to the 
duration of litigation, although mitigating factors such as changed 
conditions, deadline effects, and the like might eventually overcome its 
influence, at least when trial is imminent. 
Various measures might be adopted to mitigate the sunk-cost fallacy, 
including requiring precommitment,213 assigning someone other than the 
 
 212. At present, only information a party may use to support its claims or defenses must be 
disclosed before discovery commences. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
 213. See Itamar Simonson & Barry M. Staw, Deescalation Strategies: A Comparison of 
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initial decisionmaker to determine whether continued investment in the 
project is warranted,214 assigning a member of the decision group the role 
of devil’s advocate to challenge future investment,215 and focusing on the 
potential future regret of further investment.216 
Finally, susceptibility to the sunk-cost fallacy might be reduced by 
partitioned decisionmaking. However, this would only work if the client 
and the initial lawyer could be “walled off” from choices about whether to 
settle or continue investing in discovery, an unrealistic prospect in most 
circumstances. Otherwise, subsequent choices would be tainted by the 
desire or need to justify previous choices.217 This suggests that if settlement 
counsel are retained, they should be hired from a different firm, not be 
acquainted with litigation counsel, and be, in all other aspects, an impartial 
and objective third party, untainted by involvement in prior investments in 
the lawsuit. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Considered together, the results of our experiments suggest that 
lawyers rely on intuitive cognitive mechanisms to evaluate cases. 
Consequently, these evaluations can be misleading and can encourage 
wasteful litigation strategies. Lawyers’ intuition leads them to want to take 
chances on trial that are not worth taking (framing effect); to accumulate 
unnecessary information about their cases while avoiding information that 
might undermine the value of their cases (confirmation bias); to seek 
 
Techniques for Reducing Commitment to Losing Courses of Action, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 419, 425 
(1992) (“[S]etting precise decision rules before knowing the outcome should make it more difficult for 
a manager to interpret negative evidence as ambiguous or supporting continuation of the project.”). 
 214. See Eyal Biyalogorsky, William Boulding & Richard Staelin, Stuck in the Past: Why 
Managers Persist with New Product Failures, 70 J. MARKETING 108, 118 (2006) (recommending that 
decisions about whether to continue or stop an ongoing project be made by someone possessing no 
prior beliefs about the project). 
 215. See Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt & Frey, supra note 191, at 644 (“[E]scalation tendencies over 
multiple decisions appear to be reduced by using heterogeneous groups in which one group member is 
additionally assigned the role of a devil’s advocate.”). 
 216. See Kin Fai Ellick Wong & Jessica Y.Y. Kwong, The Role of Anticipated Regret in 
Escalation of Commitment, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 545, 551 (2007) (recommending that 
decisionmakers be primed to anticipate their future regret if they are misled into erroneously continuing 
investment). 
 217. See Gunia, Sivanthan & Galinsky, supra note 207, at 1243 (“[O]rganizations truly intent on 
de-escalating should identify decision-makers who are not only competent but psychologically removed 
from prior decision-makers.”). 
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information that they do not need and then rely on that information in ways 
that promote litigation (nonconsequentialist reasoning); and to throw good 
money after bad (sunk-cost fallacy). Combined with previous research on 
self-serving biases that suggests lawyers suffer from an excess of 
overconfidence about their ability to win at trial,218 it is clear that lawyers 
rely on several intuitive processes that encourage needless litigation. 
Deliberative reasoning is never perfect, of course. Anyone who has 
ever made a simple math error knows that deliberative reasoning can lead 
to bad judgment as well.219 Researchers have identified circumstances in 
which deliberative reasoning produce worse decisions than relying on 
intuition.220 In the main, these studies involve aesthetic judgments about 
consumer goods, however.221 We endorse the prescription that lawyers 
should be more deliberative because we believe that the settlement of civil 
disputes is not the kind of setting in which that intuitive reasoning would 
provide any advantages over deliberation. 
To be sure, lawyers might rely on other processes that we did not 
study that facilitate settlement. An aversion to the pressure and risks 
associated with trial might well come into play as the trial approaches.222 
The research we present here cannot determine whether intuitions that 
facilitate settlement outweigh intuitions that facilitate litigation in the 
 
 218. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 219. For a discussion of a costly and embarrassing example of a System 2 error made by highly 
deliberative engineers, see ARTHUR G STEPHENSON ET AL., MARS CLIMATE ORBITER MISHAP 
INVESTIGATION BOARD PHASE 1 REPORT (1999), available at ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/ 
1999/MCO_report.pdf (attributing the failure of a Mars mission to the use of the wrong units of 
measurement). 
 220. See Leonard Lee, On Amir, Dan Ariely, In Search of Homo Economicus: Preference 
Consistency, Emotions, and Cognition, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 173, 179 (2009) (presenting research 
showing greater preference consistency for consumer goods when emotional reasoning is encouraged); 
Itmar Simonson, Regarding Inherent Preferences, 18 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 191, 193–94 (2008) 
(describing research suggesting that intuitive processes will produce worse judgments in some settings); 
Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the 
Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185–87 (1991) 
(describing studies in which inducing deliberative reasoning produces regret about choices). 
 221. But see Kelly Goldsmith & On Amir, On the Antecedents of Rational Choice Under 
Uncertainty 11–12 (June 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1938787 (showing that certain errors in judgment can be reduced by relying 
more heavily on intuitive processes).  
 222. See Robert N. Beaudoin, University of Windsor Mediation Services 10th Anniversary: 
Remarks on the Civil Justice Review Task Force, 21 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 5, 8 (2006) 
(“Any case could be settled, no matter how difficult, no matter the amount of lawyers involved with 
these words: ‘You’re On Tomorrow!’ Upon receipt of the notice of an impending trial date, 
negotiations between the parties would intensify and, in the majority of cases, a settlement would be 
reported by the next day.”).  
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aggregate. Furthermore, cognitive strategies for assessing cases are not the 
only factors that that make litigation unnecessarily costly. The cognitive 
illusions studied in the experiments reported in this Article are merely some 
of the pieces of the puzzle. They may be dispositive in some cases, but get 
swamped by one or more different factors in others. Nevertheless, the 
intuitions we have identified present obstacles to settlement. Lawyers and 
judges interested in streamlining the litigation process would be well 
served by taking these intuitions into account when evaluating cases. 
B.  BEST PRACTICES AND POTENTIAL REFORMS 
How can these impediments to efficient litigation be addressed? No 
panacea exists, of course. Each of the cognitive processes we studied has 
different causes and consequences. The phenomenon-specific nature of 
those suggestions makes it difficult to identify practices or reforms that 
would counteract these influences in all cases. We already have identified 
some measures that might ameliorate the influence of those particularly 
misleading intuitions. Nevertheless, we sketch out steps that lawyers, 
judges, and reformers can take to reduce the influence of intuitions that 
tend to prolong litigation. 
1.  Encourage Deliberative Processing 
As we have discussed, most people rely too heavily on intuition, and 
too little on deliberation. As the lawyers’ responses to the CRT 
demonstrate, lawyers display this same tendency. Expending the time and 
effort necessary to engage in deliberate processing might mitigate, if not 
entirely eliminate, errors caused by the cognitive illusions we have tested. 
For example, psychologists have found that deliberative processing can 
overcome framing effects223 and mitigate the confirmation bias.224 
It seems hard to believe that lawyers do not already consider 
litigation-related decisions as carefully as possible. Lawyers are busy, 
however, and often short of resources. In some circumstances, they might 
 
 223. See Todd McElroy & David L. Dickinson, Thoughtful Days and Valenced Nights: How 
Much Will You Think About the Problem?, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 516, 519 (2010) 
(“[R]esearch on framing effects has shown that more effortful and deliberative processing will attenuate 
framing effects, whereas less effort and more automatic processing will enhance this framing effect.”); 
Thomas & Millar, supra note 79, at 146. 
 224. See JONATHAN. ST. B.T. EVANS, BIAS IN HUMAN REASONING: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
108 (1989) (suggesting that poor performance on the Wason card selection task is attributable to 
subjects’ reliance on a “preconscious heuristic judgment of relevance”). 
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tend to trust their intuition more than they should.225 Nevertheless, they 
should expend the effort to engage in deliberative processing, because the 
cost of doing so is likely smaller than the costs they will incur if their 
decisions are distorted by misguided intuitions.  
2.  Expand Training 
Another strategy might be to teach lawyers about cognitive illusions 
and how to dispel them. This could be done either in law schools or as part 
of lawyers’ continuing legal education while in practice. Tutoring seems to 
improve performance on the Wason card selection task, for example.226 
Additionally, some data suggest that lawyers with extensive training or 
experience in mediation might make fewer mistakes in analyzing 
settlements.227 Lawyers seeking to reduce their error rates should consider 
seeking training by or advice from skilled and experienced mediators. 
3.  Strengthen Initial Disclosure 
Expanding the initial disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(a) would simplify or eliminate many of the decisions 
parties presently must make concerning what information to pursue. That 
Rule currently limits the scope of initial disclosure to information favorable 
to the disclosing party228 and exempts material intended to be used solely 
for impeachment. Because of these limitations, parties must still make 
complicated decisions about the scope of discovery they will pursue. 
Because of the incompleteness of initial disclosure, litigators recognize that 
they must approach the discovery process with the kind of suspicion that 
might facilitate the intuitions we have identified, which lead lawyers to 
 
 225. See Dan Sperber, Francesco Cara & Vittorio Girotto, Relevance Theory Explains the 
Selection Task, 57 COGNITION 31, 90 (1995) (“[P]eople are nearly-incorrigible ‘cognitive optimists.’ 
They take for granted that their spontaneous cognitive processes are highly reliable, and that the output 
of these processes does not need re-checking. Just as they trust their perceptions, they trust their 
spontaneous inferences and their intuition of relevance.”). 
 226. See Magda Osman, Can Tutoring Improve Performance on a Reasoning Task Under 
Deadline Conditions?, 35 MEMORY & COGNITION 342, 349 (2007) (reporting that tutoring improved 
performance on a Wason card selection task). 
 227. See Kiser, Asher & McShane, supra note 45, at 587–88 (reporting that parties represented by 
an attorney who also was an experienced mediator are less subject to framing effects in settlement 
decisions). 
 228. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (limiting initial disclosure of names and contact 
information of individuals and documents in the disclosing party’s possession to those likely to have 
discoverable information “that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses”). The 
scope of initial disclosure was not always so limited. See 4 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 26.21, 26.28[3] (3d ed. 2012). 
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pursue unimportant information. Further, receiving more information 
earlier and more cheaply would minimize the “waiting causes weighting” 
phenomenon without unduly increasing costs. 
Protocols encouraging or requiring the prefiling exchange of 
information should be considered.229 Allowing parties to assess the strength 
of their opponent’s case without investing in preparing a complaint or a 
responsive pleading might discourage lawsuits and lead to earlier 
settlements. Although initial disclosure has its flaws,230 and some have 
argued that initial disclosure does not improve the speed or efficiency of 
litigation,231 it does hold out the prospect of reducing the incidence of 
cognitive errors that lead to overdiscovery and settlement delay. 
4.  Tighten Limits on Discovery 
In addition to forcing parties to disclose more evidence unilaterally at 
the outset, limiting their ability to gather other evidence would also reduce 
lawyers’ tendencies to gather too much information. Although the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure currently restrict the number of depositions that 
may be noticed232 and the number of interrogatories that may be served,233 
they place no restrictions on the number of requests for production and 
requests for admission that may be served. Since requests for production 
are the most burdensome type of discovery request, it makes sense to limit 
their use as well. Therefore, numerical limits on the number of requests for 
admissions and the number of requests for production that may be served 
should be considered.234 
Parties could attempt to circumvent such limits by stipulating around 
them, of course. That possibility, however, has not prevented limits on 
 
 229. See HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 107–11 (1996) (establishing prefiling protocols for the 
exchange of information and settlement negotiations). 
 230. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory 
Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 785–86 (1995) (criticizing mandatory disclosure). 
 231. See Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A Controversial Device with No Effects, 21 
PACE L. REV. 203, 262 (2000) (concluding that mandatory disclosure has not expedited case disposition 
or saved litigation costs). 
 232. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (limiting the number of depositions that may be taken to ten 
per side absent stipulation or leave of court). 
 233. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may 
serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.”). 
 234. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for 
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 46 (1994) (“[W]e should provide a more 
constricted presumptive amount of discovery and a short period to a certain trial date in the vast 
majority of cases.”). 
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interrogatories and depositions from being effective, and courts could 
impose restrictions on the scope of parties’ stipulations if necessary. 
Furthermore, requiring parties to use such stipulations to obtain extra 
discovery could force them to stop and think before gathering unneeded 
information. 
Tighter restrictions on discovery have worked well in some 
circumstances. For example, Stephen Susman has proposed a protocol for 
reducing the cost of discovery in large-scale litigation.235 The limits he 
suggests that parties adopt by agreement are stricter than those presently 
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As an example, his 
suggested protocol addresses the problem of document requests, which 
presently are unlimited, in a creative and efficacious way.236 Similarly, 
even very strict limits on the duration of trial presentations have been well 
received.237 
Adopting these proposals would not be costless. Some cases might be 
adjudicated based on less information than is needed to optimize the 
opportunity for a correct result.238 Also, some deserving plaintiffs may lose 
cases they should have won because they were unable to find helpful 
information in the defendant’s possession (actually, this would be true of 
either plaintiffs or defendants, although in certain types of litigation, it may 
be expected that it would adversely affect plaintiffs more often). On the 
other hand, it would avoid other costs, such as by saving a great deal of 
money, time, and effort that otherwise would be invested in unnecessary 
discovery, decreasing pressure to tighten pleading standards even further, 
encouraging movement out of the public court system and into the realm of 
private dispute resolution, and so on. In our view, there is more sweet than 
bitter in restricting discovery more tightly, but admittedly this particular 
proposal may contain some of each. Doing nothing, however, risks the 
further withering of the civil justice system as unaffordable discovery and 
other elaborate procedural protections render it useless and prohibitively 
 
 235. Lorna G. Schofield, Greater Efficiency in Civil Procedure, 36 LITIG., Spring 2010, at 1, 2 
(describing Susman’s protocols, including forbidding depositions longer than three hours). 
 236. See Stephen Susman, Pretrial Agreements Made Easy, TRIAL BY AGREEMENT (May 4, 
2011), http://trialbyagreement.com/pretrial-agreements/pretrial-agreements-made-easy/ (recommending 
that documents be produced on a rolling basis). 
 237. See Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 
35 ARIZ. L. REV. 663, 665 (1993) (identifying jurisdictions that have adopted time limits on discovery). 
 238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendments (“Discovery 
frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be available to the parties and thereby makes for 
a fairer trial or settlement.”). 
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expensive for almost every purpose.239 
5.  Continuing Active Judicial Case Management 
During the past three decades, judges have been encouraged, and even 
required, to take a more active role in managing their cases.240 If nothing 
else, courts should continue to increase their supervision of the discovery 
process. Although judges are not immune to cognitive error, they bring an 
outsider perspective to decisions about discovery and settlement.  
One step judges should take is to encourage parties to pursue the most 
diagnostic or important discovery first. This runs counter to the common 
practice of beginning with less important depositions and gradually 
building toward the more important ones. Although that practice may result 
in lawyers acquiring more familiarity with the case or even performing 
somewhat better by the time the most important depositions are taken, it 
also tends to lock in settlement, discouraging sunk costs before the most 
diagnostic information is obtained. 
Judges also might continue and increase their management of motion 
practice, such as by limiting the number of motions that parties may file or 
limiting the length of those that are permitted. Although some summary 
judgment motions succeed (or at least provide diagnostic information 
regarding the likely case outcome if they fail), others are obviously futile 
and provide no diagnostic information. They do, however, increase sunk 
costs.241 Therefore, preventing or limiting investment in unpromising 
motions may increase the odds of settlement. 
IV.  LIMITATIONS 
Our study obviously has limitations. First, our experiments—like all 
experiments—are unavoidably artificial. No hypotheticals in a written 
 
 239. See CAMPOS, supra note 23, at 21, 24, 87; Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, 
Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather Than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 
515 (reporting the results of a survey of members of the American College of Trial Lawyers, 
“Participants complained ‘[w]e have sacrificed the prospect of attainable justice for the many in the 
interest of finding that one needle in the [forest of] haystacks’”) (quoting AM. COLL. OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
INTERIM REPORT & 2008 LITIGATION SURVEY OF THE FELLOWS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS app. B, at B-1 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jep/symposia/ 
documents/2008_CJS_Materials/7_Perspectives_on_eDiscovery_%28pt1%29.pdf). 
 240. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, American General Jurisdiction Trial Courts: New Visions, New 
Guidelines, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 189, 189, 224 (2006); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 374 (1982).  
 241. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 180, at 113–14 (discussing this phenomenon). 
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questionnaire, no matter how detailed or carefully crafted, can recreate the 
rich environment in which lawyers’ litigation-related decisions are made. 
Nevertheless, as we have explained elsewhere, our methodology has 
value;242 in particular, it allows us to identify the kinds of cognitive 
strategies lawyers use to assess cases. We cannot determine whether 
lawyers adopt additional approaches in actual cases, of course, and so 
caution should be exercised in interpreting and applying our results. 
Second, although we had over four hundred lawyer subjects from 
several states, our population of subjects is neither as broad nor as diverse 
as might be desirable. Our results might deserve greater confidence if we 
also had run additional experiments using different problems on the 
cognitive illusions we tested, and drawn subjects from a wider and more 
diverse population. In particular, lawyers accustomed to representing 
plaintiffs may be underrepresented in the experiments reported in this 
Article. This might matter because plaintiffs’ counsel may differ 
systematically from defendants’ counsel. In particular, the different 
approach that contingency-fee lawyers (who usually represent plaintiffs) 
must adopt in litigating cases because their compensation is not assured 
may make them less susceptible to some of the cognitive phenomena we 
tested (such as nonconsequentialist reasoning). On the other hand, it may 
make them more susceptible to other cognitive phenomena we tested (such 
as confirmation bias and the sunk-cost fallacy) because they have a more 
direct financial interest in both the costs incurred and the potential recovery 
than do defendants’ counsel, who are typically paid by the hour.243 
Third, we tested lawyers individually. In practice, lawyers typically 
collaborate with other lawyers, especially in substantial cases. Two or more 
lawyers might perform better than a single lawyer.244 Additionally, 
others—such as nonparty insurers and their counsel—are sometimes 
involved in the evaluation of settlement. The delegation of negotiating 
authority to other agents might mitigate the biases of litigants and their 
 
 242. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 47, at 819–21. 
 243. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Defending Torts: What Should We Know?, 1 J. TORT L. 3, 7 (2007) 
(noting the widespread assumption that “defense counsel is presumably being paid on an hourly basis”). 
 244. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xiii (2004) (“[U]nder the right 
circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are often smarter than the smartest people in 
them.”). But see George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information 
Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 54 (2004) (“Even if individual 
attorneys are subject to bias, however, important cases are generally pursued by teams of attorneys, and 
one might hope that groups would be more reasonable and less extreme in their judgments. 
But . . . evidence suggests otherwise; research on group polarization and the ‘severity shift’ suggests 
that groups may come to more extreme judgments than individuals.”) (citations omitted). 
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counsel.245 Furthermore, lawyers seldom make decisions about the timing 
and content of settlements entirely independently of their clients. It is the 
clients who ultimately must decide whether, and if so when, to settle.246 
They also may be consulted by their counsel at various points in the pretrial 
process, such as before an additional expensive round of discovery is 
initiated. It is unclear whether this collaborative aspect of litigation-related 
decisionmaking would increase, decrease, or leave undisturbed the impact 
of psychological biases on lawyers. Lawyers usually are more experienced 
at making litigation-related decisions than are their clients, even clients 
who are sophisticated corporations with experienced in-house counsel. 
Therefore, it is not clear that consulting with their clients would enable 
lawyers to avoid psychological biases more successfully than they could on 
their own. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Researchers have found that people commit cognitive errors in a 
variety of situations. In the litigation context, these errors can cause 
litigants to make poor choices about whether and when to settle. The results 
of our experiments demonstrate that these same cognitive errors likely 
distort lawyers’ choices about what advice to provide their clients 
concerning settlement. As a result, lawyers sometimes may be encouraging 
their clients to delay settlement when they should not, and advising them to 
reject settlement offers that they should accept. Unfortunately, it appears 
that lawyers are about as susceptible to cognitive error as their clients, so 
the hope that lawyers will be able to mitigate their clients’ cognitive 
shortcomings in evaluating possible settlements appears to be unwarranted. 
This means that, despite the assistance of counsel, some cases will settle 
later than they should, and other cases that ought to have been settled will 
not settle at all. Consequently, litigants will invest more resources in 
litigation than they need to, their excessive investments will drain from the 
economy resources that could be more productively deployed elsewhere, 
and courts will be forced to waste their limited resources by making 
decisions that are unnecessary. In our view, more attention should be 
 
 245. See Guthrie & Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment and Litigation, supra note 47, at 
2033, 2036, 2047 (presenting research showing that insurance executives avoid several common 
cognitive errors); Michael J. Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts 
Between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 502, 504 (1992) (“[P]arties 
find . . . the delegation of bargaining authority to the insurer to be a valuable device for improving the 
bargaining position of the insurer against potential plaintiffs.”) (footnote omitted). 
 246. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) (“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decision whether to settle a matter.”). 
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devoted to ensuring that more cases settle, and that they settle as early as 
they should. Although we have attempted to suggest some palliative 
remedies, they are neither easy nor complete cures. There may be 
conflicting views about how many cases should settle and how early they 
should settle, but few would argue that attractive settlements should be 
delayed or spurned simply because lawyers commit cognitive errors in 
analyzing them. 
WIST7 4/14/2013  1:55 PM 
160 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:--- 
APPENDIX I: FRAMING SCENARIO; COPYRIGHT DISPUTE 
Imagine that you are representing a [plaintiff /defendant] in a 
copyright action. [Your client/The plaintiff] is claiming $200,000 in 
damages against the defendant. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are 
midsized publishing companies with annual revenues of about $2.5 million 
per year. The [defendant/plaintiff] is represented by competent attorneys 
with whom you do not have previous experience. You believe that the case 
is a simple one, but it presents some tough factual questions. There is no 
dispute as to the amount at stake, only as to whether the defendant’s actions 
infringed on the plaintiff’s copyright. You believe that the plaintiff has a 50 
percent chance of recovering the full $200,000 and a 50 percent chance of 
recovering $0. You expect that should the parties fail to settle, each will 
spend approximately $50,000 at trial in litigation expenses. Assume that 
there is no chance that the losing party at trial will have to compensate the 
winner for these expenses. 
The case is approaching a trial date and the [defendant/plaintiff] has 
offered to settle with your client for [$60,000/$140,000]. The 
[defendant/plaintiff] has proposed this as a take-it-or leave-it offer and 
asserts that they will go to trial if your client rejects the offer. Your client 
has asked for your opinion as to whether to accept the offer. Should the 
[plaintiff/defendant] agree to [accept $60,000/pay $140,000] to settle the 
case? 
Yes  No 
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APPENDIX II: CONFIRMATION BIAS SCENARIO; GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION PROBLEM 
Imagine that you are representing a plaintiff in a case alleging gender 
discrimination. The plaintiff works as a computer programmer at a large 
software firm. She contends that she was passed over for promotion to the 
position of “software engineer” because of her gender. The plaintiff’s 
complaint alleges that the firm’s “male managers never promote female 
employees to the position of software engineer.” The defendant denies this 
contention. 
During the deposition of a human resources officer, you learned about 
four former employees who had been promoted to the position of “software 
engineer” and who had qualifications similar to her own. The officer could 
not remember all of the details, however. The defendant asserted that it can 
only fill in the details about these four former employees by having this 
officer spend roughly thirty hours searching for each file. This is partly 
because a recent flood badly damaged the personnel records at the 
defendant’s central offices. 
You have served a set of interrogatories seeking the missing 
information about these four former employees. The defendant objected to 
the interrogatories and you moved to compel answers. The defendant has 
asserted that the information is not relevant to the plaintiff’s allegation, and 
that even if it is, the burden of providing it likely outweighs its likely 
benefit. 
You are planning to file a motion to compel responses to your 
interrogatories. Several discovery motions have already been filed in this 
case, and in frustration, the judge has warned both sides to seek only 
information that is truly necessary. Therefore, you want to limit the scope 
of your motion as much as possible. 
Please identify the file or files that must be examined to determine if 
the plaintiff’s allegation that “male managers never promote female 
employees to the position of software engineer” is likely to be true or false. 
Do not identify any more files than are absolutely necessary. (Please check 
the line next to the file or files that are relevant.) 
  A. The personnel file of an employee whose gender is unknown, but 
who was recently promoted by a male supervisor to the position of 
software engineer. 
  B. The personnel file of an employee whose gender is unknown, but 
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who was recently promoted by a female supervisor to the position of 
software engineer. 
  C. The personnel file of a male employee who was recently 
promoted to the position of software engineer by a supervisor whose 
gender is unknown. 
  D. The personnel file of a female employee who was recently 
promoted to the position of software engineer by a supervisor whose 
gender is unknown. 
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APPENDIX III: NONCONSEQUENTIALIST REASONING; 
SETTLEMENT DECISION 
You represent the plaintiff in a product liability suit. The plaintiff is 
twenty-seven years old, unmarried, and is a line worker at an automobile 
assembly plant. He was injured while working with a high-temperature 
robotic welding unit manufactured by the defendant. The unit exploded 
suddenly, shattering the worker’s safety face shield (which is a specialized 
shield that the defendant also supplied). The plaintiff suffered severe facial 
scarring. 
The plaintiff has obtained a recovery from his employer through the 
state worker’s compensation system for all lost wages and medical 
expenses, but is also suing the manufacturer of the unit for damages not 
covered by the worker’s compensation system (including emotional 
distress and harm arising from his disfigured appearance). The plaintiff 
alleges that the unit was improperly manufactured. The defendant, 
however, contends that the worker was using the unit improperly. 
Discovery is largely complete, and has produced much conflicting 
evidence regarding the source of the accident. Determining the cause is 
difficult because the unit was completely destroyed in the explosion. 
Simple version: A report concerning the cause of the accident has 
been issued by a government workplace safety agency. It concludes that 
“although an exact cause of the worker’s injury cannot be conclusively 
assigned, a defect in the welding unit was the more likely cause of the 
explosion, rather than misuse of the unit by the worker.” 
Complex version: A report concerning the cause of the accident will 
be issued by a government workplace safety agency in two days. This 
report might attribute the primary cause of the accident as either to a defect 
in the unit or to operator misuse. 
The report will not be dispositive, but it will be admissible and you 
believe that it will likely be compelling to the jury. 
Earlier today, the defendant offered to settle the case for $400,000. It 
has agreed to leave this offer open for one week. Your client feels that this 
offer feels low because his injuries have caused him severe embarrassment 
and depression. He is so badly disfigured that he is reluctant to appear in 
public. His longtime girlfriend has also abandoned him. Nevertheless, he 
has said that he might be willing to accept the offer because he is also 
anxious to get past the lawsuit and get on with his life. He is also worried 
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about his chances at trial. He has asked your advice on whether he should 
settle. 
Earlier today, the defendant offered to settle the case for $400,000. It 
has agreed to leave this offer open for one week. 
What would you advise the client to do? 
____ Accept the settlement 
____ Reject the settlement and get ready for trial 
Complex version adds the following option and the text that follows 
(on the subsequent page): 
____ Wait to decide whether to accept or reject the settlement until the 
government report is available 
If you advised your client to wait, please answer the following 
additional question: 
It is now two days later. The report has been issued. It concludes that 
“although an exact cause of the worker’s injury cannot be conclusively 
assigned, a defect in the welding unit was the more likely cause of the 
explosion, rather than misuse of the unit by the worker.” 
The defendant has called to state that the $400,000 settlement offer 
still stands as is. What is your advice now? 
____ Advise your client to accept the settlement 
____ Advise your client to reject the settlement and get ready for trial 
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APPENDIX IV: SUNK-COST SCENARIO; CONTRACT DISPUTE 
You are advising one of your clients, one of the nation’s leading 
manufacturers of semiconductor components, in a lawsuit alleging breach 
of contract. Your client is the plaintiff. The defendant is a large engineering 
firm that designs and sells highly specialized equipment for the electronics 
industry. The lawsuit arises out of the defendant’s sale of machines used to 
produce semiconductors. 
The parties agree that the machines, as installed in the plaintiff’s 
facility, are producing an unacceptably high defect rate relative to industry 
norms. The plaintiff asserts that the machines are flawed and must be 
replaced. The defendant contends that flaws in the design of plaintiff’s 
fabrication facility are causing the defects. Discovery has been completed 
and has produced conflicting evidence. The best estimate you can make as 
to the likelihood of success for the plaintiff is 50 percent. If the case goes to 
trial, it will be decided by a jury. 
If the plaintiff is successful, it would likely recover about $1,000,000 
in damages, inclusive of interest (which is the cost of completely replacing 
the machines, and related consequential damages). The contract does not 
contain a provision authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party. 
Discovery has concluded and the case is close to its trial date. At the 
insistence of the court, the parties participated in a settlement conference. 
After lengthy negotiations, the defendant finally offered to pay $480,000 in 
exchange for a dismissal of the lawsuit and a general release of all claims 
arising out of the contract. The defendant insists that this is its final offer, 
and that it will not agree to pay a penny more. You are confident that if the 
plaintiff does not accept the offer, the case will proceed to a trial, which 
you estimate will cost the plaintiff roughly $70,000 in attorney’s fees, 
expert witness fees, and other nontaxable costs. 
To date, the plaintiff has spent a total of [$90,000/$420,000] in 
pursuing its claim, including attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and other 
nontaxable costs. 
The plaintiff has asked for your advice concerning defendant’s 
settlement proposal, and you have agreed to provide it. What advice would 
you give your client? 
______Accept defendant’s settlement offer 
______Reject defendant’s settlement offer 
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